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INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, millions of Americans watched in awe and
horror as over a period of less than two hours, a succession of
Associate Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. J.D.,
Stanford University, 1991; B.A., Wesleyan University, 1988. I would like to thank Tracey
George, Jeffrey Lubbers, Jim Salzman, Tom Sargentich and Peter Smith for their
enthusiastic support of this project, advice, and useful and extensive comments on
earlier drafts. I am also grateful to Elissa Okoniewski and Jaime Tomhave for their
excellent research assistance, and to Margaret Byrne Ikeda, Jaclyn Okn and the
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382 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 10:2
commercial airliners crashed first into the two World Trade Center
towers in New York City, and then into the Pentagon in suburban
Virginia. As government officials and news organizations scrambled
in the first hours after the events to gather information, possible
explanations for the crashes were offered. One theory was the
obvious assumption that the planes had all been hijacked by
"terrorists" using some kind of weapons (guns, bombs) that had
presumably been smuggled onto the planes in circumvention of
security procedures.
As more concrete information became available in the hours and
days that followed, however, the actual circumstances appeared to
deviate significantly from these early assumptions. One surprising
discovery was that no firearms or explosives appeared to have been
used in the attacks, and that the hijackers were able to overpower the
flight crew and take over control of the four airplanes with what
appeared to have been relatively small knives.' This discovery was
followed by the even more stunning realization that the weapons
used by the hijackers were not prohibited by any applicable
regulations, and therefore need not have been smuggled past airline
2
security.
Attention then appropriately shifted from questions about the
potential for a conspiracy involving the circumvention of airline and
airport security regulations to the regulations themselves and the
procedures for their implementation and enforcement. The most
critical concerns were whether airport security regulations were
sufficient to provide a reasonable level of safety for airline passengers
(and the public as a whole) and/or whether sufficient mechanisms
were in place to enforce the applicable regulations.
The federal agency authorized by Congress to ensure the safety
and security of American commercial air travel is the Federal
1. See Mark Belko, Is Air Security Still Too Weak?, PITTSBURGH PosT-GAZETTE, Sept.
23, 2001, at A19 (writing that the terrorists used "concealed, undetectable or even
permitted items to take over airplanes and used them as bombs to inflict destruction
on the ground without regard to their own lives... [they] used small knives, box
cutters and razors to take control of the cockpits."); see also Roger Simon, The Month
that Shook the World, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 12, 2001 at 2 (noting that we have
seen terrorists "bring down twin towers in Manhattan, set the Pentagon ablaze, kill
more Americans in a single day than any attack in history, all while armed, it appears,
with nothing more than utility knives, box cutters available in any hardware store
and, before September 11, legal to bring aboard airplanes.").
2. See Shelley Murphy, America Attacks/Impact on New England; Logan's Baggage
Screeners Defended Workers Unfairly Blamed, Company Supervisor Says, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 10, 2001, at B1 ("'I am very confident that nothing got beyond this checkpoint
that wasn't allowed,' said [Carter] Bibbey, who was one of fifty-one Globe Aviation
employees working at the American Airlines terminal on Sept. 11 ... ").
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Aviation Administration ("FAA"), a branch of the U.S. Department
of Transportation. For decades prior to the events of September 11,
legal commentators and other observers of the structure and
functions of the administrative state had focused substantial attention
on the FAA and its regulation of the airline industry. A trend of
comprehensive "deregulation" of the industry over the past few
decades in regard to fares, scheduling, and flight plans had produced
both praise3 and criticism 4 from commentators concerned with the
impact of lifting such a wide array of requirements from an industry
so vital to the life and economy of the nation.
In addition to this debate over deregulation, recent airline
disasters - including the Pan Am crash in Lockerbie, Scotland in
1988, the Trans World Airline ("TWA") crash off the coast of Long
Island in 1996, and the Valujet disaster in the Florida Everglades that
same year - have focused attention on the FAA and the possible
role its regulatory structure might have played in any particular
3. See, e.g., Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, Airline Deregulation and Public
Policy, SCIENCE, Aug. 18, 1989, available at 1989 WL 3077706 (restating that the
American Association for the Advancement of Science stated, "It is our contention
that a move toward reregulation would be misguided. The airline deregulation
experiment' has been a success."); Get Us to the Gate on Time, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20,
1987, available at 1987 WL-WSJ 325768 ("These problems [of delays and cancelled
flights] notwithstanding, Americans have benefited greatly from deregulation of the
airline industry. More people are flying to more destinations at lower fares than even
the most optimistic deregulators could have imagined in 1978."); Ed Timms, Two
Sides of Airline Deregulation, Competition Cuts Fares, but Critics Question Safety Incentive,
DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Dec. 8, 1985, at Al; Terrance M. Fox, Deregulation Shouldn't Be a
Dirty Word, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 31, 1988, at D1.
4. Alan Eysen, View from the Cockpit: A Cross-Country Ride in a Jetliner - Picking its
Way Through Hazards Ranging From a Complex Airborne Rush Hour to a Treacherous
Thunderstorm - Illuminates Challenges Confronting American Commercial Aviation Today,
NEWSDAY, Sept. 25, 1988, at 6 ("In recent years, its industry critics have charged that
the FAA is trying to oversee an industry made frenetic by deregulation, with outdated
equipment, inadequate funding, and a management subject to political
interference."); Tom Belden, Fine-Tuning the Friendly Skies: Legislation is Pending to
Help Small Airlines Compete with the Nation's Leading Cariers for Routes, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Oct. 11, 1998 (page number unavailable).
A growing group of critics are asking whether America's experiment with
deregulation isn't flying off course and poorly serving millions of travelers.
Increasingly, business travelers are paying record fares to a handful of big airlines
that hold a powerful grip on scores of airports. Though new low-fare airlines
spawned by deregulation were expected to provide vigorous competition, more small
carriers have been driven out of business than the number still in the air.
Id.; Jon Hilkevitch et al., Common Sense, Leadership Are Lacking as Airlines Delays Mount
Nationwide, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 22, 2000, at 1.
[Scheduling competition] can get so fierce that airlines are willing to fly half-
empty planes - adding to congestion -rather than cede a city, or even a
share of a city's business, to a competitor .... Airlines are also intensely
wary of any intrusion onto their turf, especially the no-frills, cheap-fares kind
offered by low-cost carriers.
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accident, or on the assurance of air safety in general. Various
observers have responded to these incidents by noting the extensive
influence that airline industry representatives have on the FAA and
its policy initiatives, with some suggesting that the agency has
developed into a promoter of the profitability of the airline industry
rather than a regulator of its safety and security. Specifically, scholars
have pointed to the FAA as a victim of the phenomenon of "agency
capture," 5 and at least one agency veteran was quoted in a national
news magazine in 1995 as saying: "To tell the truth, the industry, they
really own the FAA." 
6
This Article will analyze the allegation that the FAA has been
captured" by airline industry interests. It begins with a summary of
agency capture theory, and a brief reference to some of its more
important complexities and nuances. It then reviews the history and
regulatory mandate of the agency in order to assess the validity of
claims that the FAA is the victim of capture, while at the same time
noting the inherent difficulty in making such a determination
conclusively. The Article will then detail the FAA's air security
regulatory and enforcement structure in an attempt to determine
whether there is an identifiable relationship between a possible
capture dynamic at the FAA and the tragic events of September 11.
Finally, it will briefly comment on the competing congressional
proposals for revamping air security which arose after September 11,
and will suggest that the ultimate product of the political
5. David Dana & Susan Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 473, 497 (1999).
In 'captured' agencies, agency regulators do not act as 'arm-length'
representatives of some larger 'public interest' in their interaction with
regulated industries. Instead, government officials work to advance the
agenda of current firms in the industry by formulating regulations that
benefit or at least do not substantially burden the industry .... Capture of
this sort, theorists claim, is particularly likely when an agency is changed with
regulating only a single industry (for example, the FAA and the airline
industry.).
Id. See also JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY
THEY Do IT 83-88 (1989) (suggesting that industry pressure made FAA decisions to
ground DC-10s difficult even after several crashes had occurred).
6. See, e.g., Peter Cary et al., The FAA's About Face, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July
1, 1996, at 48 (statement of Billie Vincent, a former security official at the FAA);
Richard J. Newman & Peter Cary, What's Wrong with the FAA, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., June 26, 1995, at 28-35 (reporting how the airline industry is compromising the
FAA's ability to properly regulate a passenger safety). An ongoing dispute in the
mid-90s between Department of Transportation Inspector General Mary Schivo and
top officials of the FAA concerning safety inspection activities of the agency led
Schivo to comment, during one of her many discussions of the issue with the
national press, "I have been a lawyer for 15 years and in law enforcement for 12
years. And quite frankly, I've never seen anything like it. I have never had anybody
tell me, 'Don't enforce the law.'" Id.
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compromise resulted in a significant improvement over the status
quo - the creation of an entity other than the FAA that will have
primary responsibility for ensuring the security of commercial air
travel.
I. "AGENCY CAPTURE" AND ITS REGULATORY CONSEQUENCES
A. The Administrative State and Agency Capture Theory
Federal administrative agencies have traditionally been created,
and/or authorized to perform certain regulatory functions, for two
main reasons. First, once it becomes clear that legal rules are
required to regulate some aspect of the activities of the nation (either
because of the failure of free market forces to produce the desired
state of affairs or for some other reason), and that the governmental
entities that would otherwise have the authority to construct and
enforce these rules invariably does not have the time or the resources
to perform the tasks effectively, such discrete tasks have traditionally
been delegated to a new or existing administrative body.8 Executive
branch agencies, for example, proliferated as it became increasingly
clear that they were necessary to ensure that the President was able to
fulfill his function of " ensuring that the laws are faithfully executed,"'
particularly as many more complex laws were enacted. Certainly, the
President and the White House staff could not handle even a tiny
percentage of the enforcement functions carried out by even one of
the various modern cabinet-level and sub-cabinet level departments.
In much the same way, and for similar reasons, "independent"
administrative agencies (independent because they are intentionally
structured to function outside the direct control of the Executive
Branch) have been created to assist Congress, and even at times the
Judiciary, in performing their required functions.
Second, it is generally accepted that an administrative body that is
granted regulatory authority over a specific set of issues will naturally
develop a certain level of "expertise" in that area, and that this
development will result in better and more effective regulation of
that area than would have been possible if it had been subject,
7. For extensive discussion of the history of the federal administrative structure,
see generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1189 (1986).
8. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 1.3, at 6 (3d ed. 1994) (describing the rise in administrative agencies as
the amount of administrative workload increases).
9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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instead, to more generalized governmental oversight.'0  This
expertise can arise from a combination of factual familiarity with the
kinds of issues that must arise repeatedly while regulating a certain
thing or activity, and the expert scientific or other detailed
knowledge that only a small percentage of government officials
11
possess.
The development and expansion of the administrative state has
taken on somewhat of an inevitable momentum, particularly as the
functions of the federal government expanded during and after the
Great Depression. But, the creation of administrative bodies and the
delegation of extensive authority granted to perform these new
governmental functions has created a wide array of concerns and
potentially serious legal difficulties and complications. Questions
that have formed the basis of just a small percentage of the legal
issues raised by the existence and function of administrative agencies
over the past 150 years include: the constitutionality of the delegation
of legislative authority to agencies; 12 the structures erected to allow
Congress to play a post-hoc role in reviewing the exercise of that
authority;' 3 and the impact on separation of powers on the wide array
10. See RONALD A. CASS & COLIN S. DIVER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES &
MATERIALS 9 (1987) (explaining that " [a] specialized agency like the ICC, the
argument runs, can better provide 'continuous expert supervision, capable of ad hoc
development to parallel the development of the subject matter involved.'") (quoting
Walter Gelihorn, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 9 (1941)).
11. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on
Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 452 (1999).
In addition to knowledge born of experience, agencies are given broad
regulatory power because they have professional expertise and the capability
to implement technical regulatory requirements. In particular, the
delegation of decision making to agencies is premised at least in part on
their ability to collect and analyze information and to understand the
technical issues relevant to the decisions agencies face.
Id.
12. See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)(finding Congress cannot constitutionally delegate its legislative authority to trade or
industrial associations or groups, empowering them to enact laws they deem wise and
beneficial for their trade or industries, and such delegation cannot be validated by a
legislative preface of generalities as to permissible aims); see also American Trucking
Ass'n v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953) (holding that Interstate Commerce
Commission rules governing the use of equipment leased by certified motor carriers
from exempt owners, and obtaining of equipment by interchange from other
carriers were valid because they bore a reasonable relationship to the regulatory
scheme of the Motor Carrier Act, absent express delegation).
13. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 919 (1983) (holding that section
244(c) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, authorizing one House of
Congress to invalidate an Executive Branch decision to allow a deportable alien to
remain in the United States, is unconstitutional because the action is essentially
legislative, and thus subject to the constitutional requirements of passage by a
majority of both Houses and presentation to the President).
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of different kinds of authority that agencies are given. 14
In addition to these purely legal concerns, however, observers have
noted potential practical and political consequences of the
concentration of significant governmental authority in an agency or
set of agencies. While questions have been raised about the potential
negative impact of administrative power on the rights of individuals
ever since the formation of the first modern administrative agency,
the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") in 1887,5 one thing
that was generally not questioned prior to the mid-twentieth century
was that the primary concern of federal administrative agencies
would be the promotion of what they saw as the "public good." As
Professor Richard Stewart noted, it was generally assumed until the
mid-fifties that "agency zeal in advancing the unalloyed, nonpolitical,
long-run economic interest of the general public would be assured by
the professionalism of administrators or by political mechanisms
through which the administrative branch would eternally refresh its
vigor from the stream of democratic desires." 16 But, over time, faith
in the "public interest" focus of the administrative state withered.
According to Professor Stewart, "to the extent that belief in an
objective 'public interest' remains, the agencies are accused of
subverting it in favor of the private interests of regulated and client
firms." 17
The concern was (and remains) that once a relatively small group
of government officials is given substantial authority to make and
enforce policy decisions, particularly when that group is in some way
14. See Robert B. Horowitz, Judicial Review of Regulatory Decisions: The Changing
Criteria, 109 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 136 (Spring 1994).
To traditional supporters of regulatory agencies, the complexity of modem
socioeconomic life necessitates state intervention through administrative
regulation. Administrative policies are seen as legitimate by virtue of the
impartial expertise of regulators. To their detractors, regulatory agencies
are faceless bureaucracies that exercise broad authority without being
accountable to the electorate. They are, to use a phrase in vogue during the
New Deal, a 'headless, fourth branch of government.' Regulatory agencies
thus are held to violate the separation of powers laid out by the Constitution.
Id.
15. See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and
Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1128 (2000); see also
Robery L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in an Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1194-95 (1986) (asserting that Congress established the ICC in response to claims of
discriminatory behavior and practices of the railroad industry in 1887). Controversy
arose over the scope of regulatory authority, including concern about granting final
authority and "traditionally judicial functions in an unfamiliar forum... as well as
fear of popular tyranny and derogation of property rights." Id. at 1210-12.
16. Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1669, 1682 (1975).
17. Id. at 1682-83.
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insulated from the impact of normal political forces, that group is
likely to be subjected to extensive pressure from groups that have a
particularly strong interest in the consequences of its policy
determinations. The focus of this pressure will invariably be an
attempt to promote the "private" interest of the regulated group at
the expense of some broader interest of the public as a whole, which
would otherwise have been the primary concern of the regulatory
agency. The consequences of this kind of influence in the hands of
the very entities that the agency is relied upon to control could be a
wide-ranging, and potentially dangerous distraction of agency policy
from the promotion of the public interest to the protection of private
agenda, or, in other words, a kind of excessive or hyper-influence
imposed by the regulated community.
18
Thus, while the potential negative public policy impact of this
hyper-influence by private interests is relatively easy to articulate, it is
a decidedly difficult phenomenon to isolate or remediate,
particularly given the dynamics and constraints of our administrative
system. 9  To a certain extent, of course, the structure of our
18. For detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic
Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1511, 1565-70
(1992).
The second potential pitfall of civil republicanism stems from the ability of
an ostensibly regulated industry to influence government policy. According
to the capture hypothesis, instead of providing meaningful input into
deliberation about the public interest, industry representatives co-opt
government regulatory power in order to satisfy their private desires.
Regulated entities are well organized and generally well funded, and they
often have strong interests at stake, which they do not share with the polity as
a whole. These entities have much to gain by ensuring that they have
control over government decisionmakers and that the decisionmakers whom
they do control remain in office.
Id.
19. See Thomas Merrill's discussion of the historical developments in judicial
review of agency action in the mid and late 20th century, and his observation that
courts displayed a certain reluctance to apply significant deference to agency
determinations when:
a key instrumentality of activist government - the administrative agency -
came to be regarded as suffering from pathologies not shared by other
governmental institutions such a legislatures or courts. The principal
pathology emphasized during these years was 'capture,' meaning that
agencies were regarded as being uniquely susceptible to domination by the
industry they were charged with regulating.
Thomas Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039,
1043 (1997); see also Dana & Koniak, supra note 5, at 497-98 (discussing the possible
critiques of capture theory).
Capture is, of course, an imprecise and controversial theory. The word itself
suggest undue or illegitimate industry influence, but it is possible to speak of
illegitimate interest group influence only if one has a coherent normative
baseline defining legitimate interest group influence. Moreover, even if one
has such a normative theory, it may be difficult to apply the theory in
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administrative regime not only allows for contacts and input from
interested parties in the course of agency policy-making, but often
counts on, or -indeed, requires them. Section 553 of the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), for example, requires that
notices of proposed rulemaking be published in the Federal Register;
that interested parties be given the opportunity to comment; and that
the agency take those comments into account before it issues a final
policy determination.2° This requirement has generally been lauded
as a means of preventing agencies from becoming too insulated and
isolated from the interest of the public.2 ' Likewise, the "notice and
comment" process has been relied upon by courts reviewing agency
actions as an indication that the agency has acted in a sufficiently
formal and fair manner.22
If we assume that there are competing interests involved here - on
one hand an acknowledgement of the potential negative
consequences of certain kinds of non-governmental influence on
agency decision making, and on the other, an express requirement
that the concerns and interests of the public be factored into the
administrative process - the difficulty comes in drawing the line
between needed and required public input in agency decision
making and input that rises to an undue level of dominance of the
agency function. 23 The latter end of this spectrum has generally been
distinguished from the former by some form of control as opposed to
mere influence in the hands of regulated parties, wielded so as to
dominate, as opposed to inform, the policy judgment of the
regulatory entity.
practice to the messy realities of political policymaking.
Id.
20. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553 (1994).
21. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400-01 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Wald, J.). -
Under our system of government, the very legitimacy of general
policymaking performed by unelected administrators depends in no small
part upon openness, accessibility, and amenability of these officials to the
needs and ideas of the public from whom their ultimate authority derives,
and upon whom their command must fall .... Furthermore, the importance
to effective regulation of continuing contact with a regulated industry, other
affected groups, and the public cannot be underestimated. Informal
contacts may enable the agency to win needed support for its program,
reduce future enforcement requirements by helping those regulated to
anticipate and shape their plans for the future, and spur the provision of
information which the agency needs.
22. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2171 (2001)
(holding that notice-and-comment rulemaking is one example of the kind of agency
action that appropriately carries the force of law).
23. For a comprehensive discussion of the role of private influence in regulatory
decision making, see generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000).
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This undue control and domination of federal administrative
24agencies, particularly by identifiable private parties that are subject
to the regulatory authority of the agency, has been defined as agency
or industry "capture," and has, of course, been all but universally
seen as a negative consequence. Indeed, it is referred to as a
"pathology" in administrative governance, and consequently, a
phenomenon to be either avoided or remedied. 25
26The phenomenon of capture has been variously defined, but
proponents of the theory have generally observed that capture occurs
when a regulated entity - like a large corporation, or more likely an
association of corporate interests - succeed, through lobbying or
other influential devices, in replacing what would otherwise be the
public-policy agenda of the agency with its own private and self-
serving agenda. In other words, when a regulated entity succeeds at
winning "the hearts and minds of the regulators,"27 regulation
becomes "a method of subsidizing private interests at the expense of
the public good." 28
The first articulation of the dynamic has been traced to the work of
Marver Bernstein, who, in 1955, observed what he referred to as the
natural "life-cycle" of administrative agencies."' Bernstein argued
24. It should be noted that this kind of undue influence by private entities is not
the only kind of criticism of administrative structure. There are other inherent
"pathologies" in agency structure and governance which complicate the
development and judicial review of federal regulations. "For example, agencies were
commonly regarded as mindless 'bureaucracies' more concerned with expanding
their budgets and making life comfortable for tenured civil servants than with
attending to the needs of the beneficiaries of regulation." Merrill, supra note 18, at
1050.
25. See Merrill, supra note 19, at 1043.
Starting in the 1960's, many federal judges became convinced that agencies
were prone to capture and related defects and - more importantly - that
they were in a position to do something about it. In particular, these judges
thought that by changing the procedural rules that govern agency decision
making and by engaging in more aggressive review of agency decision they
could force agencies to open their doors - and their minds - to formerly
unrepresentative points of view, with the result that capture would be
eliminated or at least reduced.
Id.
26. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 459-60 (discussing the distinction
between the somewhat mild version of private influence on agencies that he refers to
as capture, and the more severe version of special interest "domination," which he
defines as "a broader concept than capture; it occurs whenever an interest group
consistently influences an agency to regulate for the benefit of that group rather
than to promote stated statutory aims." ).
27. IAN AYERS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 63 (1992).
28. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 713, 723 (1986).
29. MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 79-
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that "the early stages of the cycle are characterized by vigorous and
independent regulation, not unlike the role of agencies imagined by
the public interest literature," but, that in later stages of the cycle,
which he called agency "senescence," "the agency often becomes
closely identified with and dependent upon the industry it is charged
with regulating."30
As the concept developed over the next few decades, observers
focused less on the stages of agency development where capture was
most likely to occur, and instead regarded capture "as something
more akin to the universal condition of the administrative state." 31
Professor Richard Stewart characterized this broader concern, when
he observed that:
It has become widely accepted, not only by public interest lawyers,
but by academic critics, legislators, judges, and even by some
agency members, that the cooperative overrepresentation of
regulated or client interests in the process of agency decision
results in a persistent policy bias in favor if these interests.32
97 (1955). See also MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 132-52 (1965)
(providing the other seminal discussion of the capture dynamic).
30. Merrill, supra note 19, at 1060.
31. Merrill, supra note 19, at 1060. Merrill provides an intriguing and useful
summary of the development of the agency capture jurisprudence, noting, among
other things the "curious symmetry" between the attitudes about capture of those
associated with right-wing economic theories, such as the Chicago school and others
(who used the theory to support arguments for market as opposed to governmental
regulation of industry), with those of more observers from the left, such as Gabriel
Kolko and ultimately Ralph Nader (who saw the theory as justifying invigoration in
government regulation). Id. at 1060-62.
These various strands of capture theory roiled together into a general pot of
discontent, out of which emerged a new popular muckraking literature. The
principal purveyors of this populist strain of capture theory were the so-
called 'Nader Raiders' who produced a string of monographs and associated
publicity in the late 1960s and early 1970s castigating various agencies for
cozying up to big business and ignoring the public interest.
Id. See also Wiley, supra note 28, at 724 (discussing of the "remarkably similar"
conception of capture theory expressed by Kolko and conservative economist Milton
Friedman).
32. Stewart, supra note 16, at 1713. See Horowitz, supra note 14, at 142.
Capture, of course, meant that a particular interest group exercised control
over the regulatory agency. At the very least, capture theory embodied the
claim that regulatory agencies served the interests, if not at the behest, of the
regulated industries. By the mid-1960's, some version of capture theory was
the conventional wisdom. And capture theory implicitly become accepted by
key members of the judiciary as well .... "
Id.; Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1027, 1065 (1990).
Administrative power to seize the initiative is especially appealing to anyone
who believes that when public agencies act, they act in the public
interest .... Less clear is the source of this public point of view, or the basis
for believing that agency initiative would necessarily serve it .... [A] n
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Indeed, agency capture is increasingly viewed less as an exception
and more as a common consequence of our federal administrative
structure.3
One of the inherent complexities of capture theory is its
requirement that identifiably "private" interests be distinguished
from "public" ones. Capture theory is based on the notion that
proper public focus of governmental agencies can be effectively
distracted by the private interests of regulated entities. But how can
it be determined where the private interests of the regulated end,
and the broad public interests begin? 34 Will there not be instances
where the private interest of a regulated party, even one as crass as
the maximization of profit of specific industry representatives, will
also serve the broader public interest in the form of additional
employment, more access to goods and services, or even general
improvement in economic conditions?3 The determination that an
abiding faith that outcomes are in the public interest requires an underlying
conviction that information and values filter into and out of agencies in
some evenhanded way. If, however, risk producers have a comparative
advantage over risk consumers in getting the administrative ear, then agency
decision making might be marred by access bias just as judicial decision
making is.
Id.
33. As Professor Mashaw notes in his summary of public choice critiques of
naive" images of the administrative regime: "administrative processes can be
understood as the means by which political victors maintain the gains for successful
interest group struggle at the legislative level. Administrative decision structures are
the devices through which legislative principals control the actions of potentially
deviant administrative agents." JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE:
USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 12-15 (1997); see also Stewart, supra
note 16, at 1687 (noting that "the critique of agency discretion as unduly favorable
to organized interests - particularly regulated client firms - has sufficient power
and verisimilitude to have achieved widespread contemporary acceptance" citing law
review articles and judicial opinions from the late 1960s and early 1970s).
34. As Michael Levine notes in his discussion of the phenomenon of regulatory
capture:
[I] t is demonstrably impossible... to construct a democratically derived and
consistent social welfare function that will allow one to assert objectively that
one outcome is socially preferred over another .... Unless a democratic,
consistent aggregation of the preferences of individuals in group is possible,
there is no objective way to tell what is socially preferred (in the 'public
interest').
Michael Levine, Regulatory Capture, in NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW 267, 268-69 (3d ed. 1999).
35. Indeed, a determination that the "private" interest of a regulated entity are
consonant with a broader public interest should not be immediately suspect, and
could fit quite neatly within the proper range of agency determination in support of
its determination of where, exactly, the public interest lay. See generally Michael E.
Levine & Jennifer L. Florence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest and the Public Agenda:
Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (discussing competing theories of how
agencies determine what constitutes the " public interest"). See also Seidenfeld, supra
note 11, at 474-79 (describing problems rising from idiosyncratic agency values).
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agency is promoting the private interest of its regulated community
therefore will not be sufficient in itself to provide conclusive evidence
of undue influence amounting to capture.
What is needed is an indication that the agency's industry-
promoting efforts arise not from its own determination of what will
promote the long-term public interest, but out of some motivation to
promote these interests despite the impact it will have on the vast
majority of affected parties, or the society as a whole. If it could be
determined, for example, that while the promotion of the private
profit motives of a firm or group of firms would provide 5,000 more
jobs to a depressed community, the same regulatory choice would
result in permanent health effects that could be expected to cause
serious injury to 15,000 people across three states (and it could be
shown that the agency knew of this risk, and had as part of its
regulatory responsibility the protection of the health of citizens);
then it could be shown that while either of its available choices would
have produced both public benefits and harms, the agency chose the
course that benefited the identifiably smaller "public" interest at the
expense of the larger one.
Assuming that public and private interests can be effectively
defined and differentiated, the explanations for the phenomenon of
agency capture can be founded in an acknowledgement of the
functional and practical limitations of agencies vis a vis regulated
parties. Proponents of the theory note that agencies, when faced
with a regulatory battle with powerful industry members, are
frequently obliged to capitulate to the superior resources
commanded by their regulated entities. In many, and arguably most
instances of federal regulation, limited financial and political
resources will require an agency to " rely on the regulated industries
themselves to furnish the information upon which the regulators
based their decisions," 36 a reliance which invariably creates "an
institutional bias favoring potentially responsible parties." 37  As
36. Dion Casey, Agency Capture: The USDA's Struggle to Pass Food Safety Regulations, 7
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 142, 142 (1998). See Stewart, supra note 16, at 1686.
Limited agency resources imply that agencies must depend on outside
sources of information, policy development, and political support. This
outside input comes primarily from organized interests, such as regulated
fums, that have a substantial stake in the substance of agency policy and the
resources to provide such input. By contrast, the personal stake in agency
policy of an individual member of an unorganized interest, such as a
consumer, is normally too small to justify such representation.
Id.
37. Bradford C. Mank, Superfund Contractors and Agency Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
LJ. 34, 54 (1993). See Stewart, supra note 16, at 1686.
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Thomas Merrill characterizes the concern, agency capture is the
likely consequence when "compact groups whose members have
high per capita stakes in a controversy out-organize and out-influence
larger more diffuse groups, resulting in a pervasive 'majoritarian bias'
on the part of decisionmakers."38 In addition to more substantial
resources, and more focused motivation, the entities that are the
primary targets of the regulation of specific agencies naturally
become extremely familiar with the decision-making processes and
structures of the agency, making their efforts to influence these
procedures inherently more successful than anyone else's.39
Furthermore, the very structures that are instituted to facilitate
public participation in the administrative process - most notably
the notice and comment procedures for informal agency rulemaking
- enhance these advantages by providing a relatively limited time
period to provide comments to proposed regulations.0 A focused,
highly motivated, and concerned regulated entity will have a
significant advantage and a genuine opportunity to dominate this
comment process from start to finish, long before less informed
entities can even begin to get their acts together.
Mark Seidenfeld recently articulated the traditional concept of
capture:
[F]irms in regulated industries and interest groups with strong
central staffs still occupy a favored position in regulatory and
The resources - in terms of money, personnel, and political influence - of
the regulatory agencies are limited in comparison to those of regulated
firms. Unremitting maintenance of an adversary posture would quickly
dissipate agency resources. Hence, the agency must compromise with the
regulated industry if it is to accomplish anything of significance.
Id.
38. Merrill, supra note 19, at 1053; see Wiley, supra note 28, at 724.
In many political situations, each member of a group benefits from
successful joint action irrespective of that member's own participation.
Thus, if the group is large, individual members have little incentive to
participate because participation is personally costly and contributes little to
the group's chances for successful joint action. Small groups encounter
fewer of such problems. If group members behave in this rational self-
interested manner, then 'there is a systematic tendency for exploitation of
the great by the small'; less numerous, more intensely concerned special
interests can predictably outmatch more numerous, more mildly concerned
consumer or 'public' interests in legislative or regulatory fora - even though
the actions of special interests imposed a net loss on society.
Id. at 724-25 (quoting M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLEcTIvE ACTION 29 (1965)).
39. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. ToMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY 113(1998).
40. See Mashaw, supra note 33, at 127-28.
41. For a discussion of the limiting effects of APA notice and comment
regulations, see Mashaw, supra note 33, at 127-28.
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political structures that allows them an advantage in influencing
agency decisions. They have the incentive and the means to
monitor what the agency does on a day-to-day basis. They often
have information without which a regulatory agency cannot do its
job. A regulated entity frequently is a large corporation with
resources to appeal agency decisions at every level. Finally,
regulated entities and special interest groups often contribute
significantly to political campaigns. For all of these reasons,
administrators have a strong incentive to cooperate with entities
directly subject to their regulatory decisions and other interest
42groups that regularly participate in the agency's proceedings.
Capture theorists, in addition to describing the various political
and institutional advantages enjoyed by industry representatives that
make capture of an agency possible, have also provided convincing
arguments for why regulators will often become willing and
enthusiastic participants in their own seduction. As Professors Jerry
Mashaw and David Harfst have observed:
Once in operation, the regulatory scheme is maintained in the
interest of the regulated industry by bureaucrats who look both to
Congress and to the industry for their rewards. These rewards flow
from industry in the form of social and business relations and the
prospects of further career opportunities in the private sector.
Rewards also include the goodwill of oversight and appropriations
committees staffed by legislators who can derive the greatest
43
electoral payoff from the regulation in question.
The development of capture theory in the mid-twentieth century
had a significant impact on the broader development of
administrative law both in the courtroom and the classroom. The
theory called into question the second of the justifications mentioned
above for the existence of the administrative state, and also for the
provision of deference to administrative agencies by courts charged
with the task of reviewing their regulatory activities - the concept of
agency "expertise.""4
The very structure of administrative law since the New Deal and
the explosion of federal involvement in the daily life of the nation -
from the Administrative Procedure Act to the key Supreme Court
cases which helped define the APA's standards like Universal Camera,45
42. Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 464.
43. JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 16
(1990).
44. Merrill, supra note 19, at 1060.
45. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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Overton Park,46 Chevron," and even later cases more skeptical of agency
function, such as State Farm- - is founded on the assumption that
agency action is entitled to some measure of "deference" because it
is informed by the kind of specific expertise that agencies are
presumed to not only enjoy, but to incorporate in their factual
determinations, legal interpretations, or policy pronouncements. If
one accepts the notion that some, if not many, agencies are the
victims of the hyper-influence of the very private entities that they are
obliged to regulate, then the assumption that any expertise the
agencies might have is actually being relied upon in their decision-
making process is dubious, at best, and the relationship between the
courts and the agencies would require a dramatic restructuring.
Indeed, the development of more exacting and penetrating review of
agency decision making, particularly agency policy making, in State
Farm and other cases," was based in large part on the belief among
many influential federal judges that capture was a widespread
phenomenon, and that courts should do more to require that
agencies actually take a "hard look" at the policy issues before them,
and apply expertise, and not industry bias, to their determinations.0
It should be noted that the dynamics of capture do not necessarily
suggest malevolent motives on the part of the regulators or the
regulated. Of course, some individuals involved in complex
regulatory relationships could have unduly venal or self-aggrandizing
46. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
47. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
48. While the Court in State Farm invalidated the agency action at issue based on
its conclusion that it had not examined "the relevant data and articulat[ed] a
satisfactory explanation for its action" it nonetheless noted that its standard of review
for agency policymaking was "narrow," and that because of the superior expertise of
the agency, a reviewing court should "not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency." Motor Vehicles Mfg's Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).
49. See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) (discussing a court's role in reviewing an
administrative decision). The Circuit Court held that the court should properly
intervene,
not merely in case of procedural inadequacies, or bypassing of the mandate
in the legislative charter, but more broadly if the court becomes aware,
especially from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not
really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not genuinely
engaged in reasoned decision-making.
Id.
50. See Civil Aeronautics Board, infra text pp. 415-16; Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at
462-63 (discussing the changes in the nature of administrative practice, including
judicial review of administrative action, that has resulted from the capture
phenomenon). See generally Gillette & Krier, supra note 32 (discussing the
relationship between agency capture and judicial deference to agency action).
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motivations, but the story of the phenomenon is not primarily (or at
least not exclusively) one of villains and blame. Professors Gillette
and Krier noted, after listing some of the commonly identified factors
that lead to agency capture, that these
examples mix sinister elements with benign ones, but the capture
argument hardly depends on the former. There is nothing sinister
in the fact that various citizens might cluster into interest groups
for the purpose of contributing recourses - data, perspectives,
arguments - to administrative deliberation. Nor is it troubling that
each such group might hold some sort of proxy for one or another
popular attitude or value .... Information, points of view, voter
attitudes, and dollars as a measure of intensity of voter attitudes
are, after all, obviously relevant to making decisions in the public
interest (unless the public interest means something utterly
unrelated to what the public is interested in) 51
The problem, therefore, comes less from the evil acts of individuals
seeking to hijack the regulatory process, than from breakdowns in
the system that allow only some of the self-interested voices to be
heard, and therefore, to have inordinate influence over the agency's
policy making.5 2
Capture theory has had its share of critics, of course, who have
doubted the real impact of the dynamic, or, more often, have
questioned its status as an independently identifiable phenomenon
distinct from the broader political dynamics identified increasingly
over the past two decades by the "public choice" school of
administrative law.n Recent scholars have questioned the notion that
51. Gillette & Krier, supra note 32, at 1066.
52. Gillette & Krier, supra note 32, at 1067.
Almost by definition, interest group pluralism can endorse decisions as 'in
the public interest' only if all the various interest groups are indeed able to
voice their wants effectively. If, instead, some groups enjoy a comparative
advantage in catering to administrative needs and desires (that is, if the
pluralist process is too singular, not sufficiently plural), there arises the
danger that agency attention will be captivated by too narrow a range of
interests and be diverted from an appropriately public perspective.
Id.
53. For summary of public choice theory, see Jody Freeman, supra note 23, at 561.
Public choice theory understands administrative decision as the product of
interest group pressure brought to bear on bureaucrats seeking rewards such
as job security, enhanced authority, or the favor of powerful legislators upon
whom the agency depends. Public choice theory shares with interest
representation a political model of interest group pressure on agencies, but
it goes still further, treating agency outcomes as products of interest group
appeals to individual bureaucrats' preferences. It extends the pathology of
capture, moreover, to legislatures. Like legislators motivated by desire for re-
election, bureaucrats rationally pursue their own interests when exercising
administrative discretion. The theory treats administrative procedures,
moreover, as a set of controls imposed on agencies by legislators seeking to
2002]
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the administrative agency is in some sense uniquely susceptible to the
kinds of concentrated interest group pressure that results in the loss
of independent governmental authority as compared to other
governmental entities.54  Specifically, observers have noted that
certain pseudo-regulatory bodies within legislatures, most notably
powerful oversight committees of the U.S. Congress, suffer from
similar dynamics of capture, as a result of structures and modalities
that are similar to those of the agencies. These similarities include
authority that has a disproportionate effect on a small and
identifiable portion of the population, long-term staff membership,
and a dramatic "revolving door" of exchange of personnel from the
regulated entity, to the committee staff, and perhaps even back
again.55 According to many of these scholars, capture theory is
merely an articulation of a specific instance of a much broader
phenomenon - "the disproportionate influence of one type of group
[business] on one governmental institution [the administrative
agency]" - within the broader framework of the influence of
powerful private interests on majoritarian governmental structures in
16general .
facilitate interest group monitoring of agencies.
Id.; For discussion of "public choice" administrative theories in general, see generally
David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO.
L.J. 97 (2000); David B. Spence, Administrative Law & Agency Policy-making: Rethinking
the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407 (1997); DANIEL A. FARBER
& PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW & PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); Frank
B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 355 (1999); William N.
Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Symposium, Faith, Hope,
and Rationality or Public Choice and the Perils of Occam's Razor, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 109
(2000).
54. See Merrill, supra note 19, at 1051-52.
Implicit in capture theory is the understanding that the central problem of
the administrative state is a relatively limited one. Only administrative
agencies are subject to the unique pathologies of bureaucracy such as
interest group capture. Rival institutions, like the legislature and the courts,
were implicitly regarded as being immune from these pathologies or at least
as suffering from them to a significantly diminished degree. Moreover, in
terms of interest group influence, the problematic actor was seen to be the
business lobby. Other groups, such as labor unions or advocates for civil
rights or the environment, were tacitly assumed to be champions of the
public interest.
Id.
55. See Mashaw, supra note 33, at 267-70 (regarding their description of the
impact of capture on congressional committees); see also Merrill, supra note 19, at
1053 (referencing the generalization of capture theory as "pessimism about the
performance of administrative agencies.., to include all political institutions").
56. Merrill, supra note 19, at 1069.
[MIature public choice theory, as it emerged in economics and political
science departments in the 1980's, works with a far more general model of
governmental action that disregards these implicit limitations. Modem
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Notwithstanding the recent tendency to see agency capture theory
as a kind of quaint and naive holdover from a less sophisticated time,
however, there is still a great deal to be gained from focusing
attention on the threats from private hyper-influence that are
idiosyncratic to federal administrative agencies. One aspect of
agencies that creates an increased likelihood of capture, even as
compared to other government entities that are subject to extensive
and organized public pressure, is the fact that agencies will often
focus on only one industry and will consequently develop regulatory
relationships with only a small set of truly interested parties. So,
while legislatures and committee staffs might be equally prone to the
pressures imposed by lobbyists and other special interest groups, the
diversity of their regulatory agenda will help limit the influence of
any one industry over their decision-making process. But the "one-
issue" agencies have no such insulation born of diversity, and can
therefore be expected to be far more likely candidates for effective,
long-term capture.
57
Another aspect of the capture theory that has fostered criticism has
been its tacit assumption that the exclusive perpetrators of agency
58capture are business or industrial lobbying forces. Some argue that
the dynamics which give rise to agency capture can be just as
effectively manipulated by other kinds of interest groups that enjoy
the same, or at least similar, advantages of resources compared to
relevant regulatory entities." However, while non-private entities
public choice theory regards all organized groups demanding services from
political institutions - including not just business and producer groups, but
also environmental groups, labor unions, civil rights groups, and rent
control activists - as being subject to a unitary logic of collective action. And
modem public choice theory regards not just administrative agencies but
also legislatures, the President, and to an increasing degree even the courts,
as institutions that should be modeled on the assumption that they seek to
maximize their own self-interested ends in the way they respond to these
multifarious groups.
Id.
57. See John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A
Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA.J. INT'L L. 531, 582 n.150 (2001) (arguing that the
removal of regulatory authority over securities from the Federal Trade Commission
and the placement of that authority with the SEC facilitated capture by the industry
by narrowing the scope of the agency's interest and making its "regulatory clientele
more homogenous.") (quoting Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence
and Interest Group Formulation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZo L. REV. 909,
925 (1994)).
58. See Merrill, supra note 19, at 1051-52.
59. Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 463.
[T] echnological advances and an awareness of interest group politics have
fostered access to agency proceedings by representatives of groups with
diffuse interests - the so-called public interest groups. Public interest group
representatives, together with an active and diverse press, bring pro-industry
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have similar incentives to seek to control federal regulation, and may
have similar, and perhaps in some instances equal, resources, the
proper function of government regulation seems to be less
threatened by influence from such public groups.
As a general matter, the interests of these groups will be broad
public interests (for example, health, safety, or environmental
protection) and their influence will therefore be less likely to lead
the agency to favor private interests at the expense of the public.
This is not to say that these public interest organizations will always
be advocating the proper government action (that their version of
what is in the " public interest" will be the only or the right version),
or that there are not other concerns created by undue influence on
their part. But, the consequences of agency capture by such an entity
are likely to pose significantly different threats to the administrative
state than industrial or other "private" party capture. An industry
representative could be expected to have profit as its primary (if not
exclusive) motivation for seeking to influence a government official.
This interest, if served, would certainly have some impact beyond the
industry's bottom line (as discussed above, increased employment,
economic health, etc.), but that impact is likely to be relatively
limited. On the other hand, the classic " public interest" entities are
invariably organized around broader and more diffuse interests in
issues which, by their nature, have an inherently broad impact on
large portions of the society, if not the society as a whole. While it is
certainly possible that the perspectives of these public interest entities
might enjoy inordinate attention (and might be ultimately
detrimental to the "public interest"), they are much more likely,
than those of industry representatives, to be "public-focused"
perspectives of the kind that agencies are designed to factor into
their decisions.
B. The Regulatory Consequences of Agency Capture
As a general matter, the current debate seems to focus less on
whether there is a phenomenon of hyper-influence by non-
governmental entities of governmental decisions, than on how
widespread that phenomenon is - on what kinds of entities are the
agency decisions to light .... Public interest groups retain staff members
who monitor and evaluate agency policies and lobbyists who bring adverse
agency decisions to the attention of legislative committee staffs or even
committee members. These groups also frequently file citizen suits
challenging such decisions in court.
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victims of this influence and what kinds are wielding it. If we assume
the existence of at least some degree of "capture" of federal
administrative agencies by their regulated communities (within the
vast panoply of other similar versions of the same dynamic), we must
next determine what regulatory consequences are likely to result
from any particular instance of the phenomenon.
By definition, successful and long-standing (if not permanent)
agency capture will result in regulation that provides private
advantages to the regulated entities (presumably some kind of
financial advantage in the case of regulated for-profit corporations)
at the expense of a broadly defined public interest. Therefore, we
would expect to see the promulgation of regulations, and/or the
construction of enforcement mechanisms, which serve in some
empirically observable sense to create a maintainable status quo
where "private" interests are perpetually favored over "public"
(again assuming that the two are actually at odds in any specific
instance), or regulatory structures which all but ensure that the
public interest will lose out to the competing private interest (or less
extensive "public" interest) in an overwhelming majority of
disputes.6°
The phenomenon need not result in completely ineffective, or
even obviously lax regulation to be viewed as a regulatory product of
agency capture. The phenomenon will be identifiable, instead, when
it can be shown that an agency makes a regulatory choice from
among an array of possible alternatives because the choice provides
advantageous results to a regulated, and dominating, private group,
at the expense of a countervailing public interest that should have
governed its decision. While it will often be difficult to isolate the
phenomenon of agency capture and separate it from the myriad
60. Wiley, supra note 28, at 725-26.
Government at virtually every level offers enormously lucrative potential
benefits (such as price supports and entry-barrier protection against
competition) to competing producers. Typically these government benefits
are temptingly available. A relatively small number of incumbent
competitors support such measure with intensity, while consumer opposition
is diluted and widely distributed. Producers are thus able to act as an
effective group far more frequently than their opposition. Government
market intervention is therefore very often an anticonsumer effort to enlarge
producers' share of social wealth. Compounding its anticonsumer
redistributive character is the dead weight loss such market regulation
usually creates; the high prices that follow from restricted output reduce
both the absolute size of the economic pie and the relative size of the
consumer's slice. In static terms, in short, such regulation tends to impose a
cost on society as a whole in order to shift wealth from consumers to
producers.
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other forces that impact the process of specific regulatory initiatives,
6 1
an analysis of some specific regulatory structures, and the context of
their development and impact, should provide credible evidence of
the hyper-influence of certain regulated entities.
Various scholars have sought to marshal such evidence in support
of a specific capture conclusion. It has been argued, for example,
that "the meat and poultry industries" have captured the U.S.
Department of Agriculture ("USDA") and the Food Safety and
Inspection Service, resulting in insufficient meat regulations. These
insufficient meat regulations have in turn created serious health risks
to the American public. Specifically, Dion Casey observed that the
proposal of a new USDA regulation that sought to diminish the
instance of e-coli bacteria contamination in meat by requiring
industry representatives to establish "Hazard Analysis and Critical
Control Point" system was zealously opposed by the American
Association of Meat Processors, based on the potential catastrophic
economic impact such a rule would have on a large percentage of
their member businesses.Z Ultimately, the proposal was abandoned
by the agency in the face of a combination of direct pressure from
the affected groups, and pressure from Congress initiated by the
affected groups.Y Less than two years after the promulgation of the
final, watered-down rule, the USDA was forced to recall more than
twenty-five million pounds of ground meat so that it could be
inspected for potential e-coli contamination.6 Instead of the
presence of the bacteria in the meat being either discovered, as a
result of the originally
proposed procedures for processing, the contamination only became
apparent when sixteen people were diagnosed with e-coli food
poisoning in Colorado in 1997.65
Professor Mark Seidenfeld cites another example of a specific
instance of agency capture, when he notes concerns raised about the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (" NRC") and its relationship with
its regulated community, and the impact of that relationship on its
activities. He notes that given the limited genuine competition for
new licenses for nuclear power plants, the NRC's primary role is
61. Professor Mashaw notes the difficulties in developing an "empirical record"
of the specific regulatory impacts of agency capture. For a complete discussion of
some recommendations for developing a "more detailed theory with determinative
procedural implications for testing, see Mashaw, supra note 33, at 118-24.
62. Casey, supra note 36, at *6-7.
63. See Casey, supra note 36, at *8
64. See Casey, supra note 36, at *10.
65. See Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 464-65.
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oversight of existing plants.6 This exclusive role leaves the agency
"especially prone to domination." 6 Seidenfeld notes that:
there is little incentive for the NRC to require deliberation by staff
members with varied perspectives. Staff members tend to have a
common background in nuclear engineering and many come from
the Navy nuclear program. This background instills in the NRC
staff a common confidence in technology's ability to overcome
basic problems. In addition, political oversight is not likely to
prevent interest group domination. Decisions not to enforce often
are based on information to which the agency is privy that is
protected from public disclosure. Moreover, the nuclear power
industry contributes heavily to the campaigns of key congressional
committee members, who have stymied efforts to beef-up agency
monitoring and enforcement of rule violations. Not surprisingly,
the NRC is perceived as an agency heavily beholden to the industry
it regulates.-
In addition to these regulatory areas, Professor Timothy Lytton has
argued that agency capture has had a significant impact on the
regulatory supervision of the gun industry.6 9 He notes that "decades
of criticism by the gun industry and the NRA [National Rifle
Association] have made the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, the federal agency responsible for promulgating and
enforcing firearms regulations, reluctant to publish information
unfavorable to gun manufacturers."7 0  He further notes that the
agency's criticisms have focused instead on limited and presumably
exceptional cases of " irresponsible dealers." 
7
Professor John Wiley also provided a discussion of the possible
impact of agency capture on antitrust regulation, specifically in the
area of "state action doctrine," which immunizes certain anti-
competitive acts by state governments from the impact of anti-trust
restrictions.72 He notes that courts that reviewed the development of
these regulations were skeptical of the impact of the input of
regulated entities on the ultimate formation of regulations, and have
consequently shown a willingness to reject such regulatory forms:
As market regulation has become the target of increasing
66. See Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 464-65.
67. Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 465.
68. Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 465.
69. Timothy Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative Institutional
Anaysis, 32 CoNN. L. REV. 1247 (2000).
70. Id. at 1253.
71. Id.
72. SeeWiley, supra note 28, at 713.
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criticism for being an instrument by which industry can exploit
the public, judicial attitudes toward states' rights and
regulation - once so neatly congruent - have collided. On
eight occasions since Parker, the [Supreme] Court has shown a
willingness to disregard the deference to states' rights that was
the bedrock of Parker's reasoning. My argument is that the
Court has done so in a largely unarticulated but historically
understandable response to growing fears of regulatory
capture. 73
In addition to these examples of specific instances of the
regulatory impact of agency capture,4 Professor Wiley has noted that
concerns about capture, and consequently about the negative impact
of the regulatory decisions of suspect agencies on the public, served
as part of the motivation for the deregulation of various activities
including stock brokerage fees, bus transportation, cable television,
natural gas, oil, telecommunications, broadcasting, banking, electric
utilities, trucking, railroads, taxi service, and of most interest to this
discussion, air passenger transport.
75
While none of these studies provide conclusive proof of the
specific instances of capture discussed, (nor do many even claim to
do so) they all provide similar and compelling evidence of regulatory
activity that is completely consistent with the phenomenon. In all of
these cases, we are presented with an agency that is given the
authority to regulate a certain activity or set of activities, and is
consequently expected to have its regulatory decisions informed by
its own articulation of the "public good." We then see evidence that
the agency appears to be distracted from this public focus by the
specific private interests of its regulated community, with its
concentration shifting, instead, to these specific needs of the
73. See Wiley, supra note 28, at 728. Similar types of concerns about undue
influence on agency decisionmakers were raised in litigation concerning regulations
by the Federal Communications Commission of "subscription television" in the early
1970s. In HBO v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit addressed arguments from consumers and
opposition industry representatives concerning the influence that the broadcast
networks enjoyed with FCC regulators. See HBO v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (1977).
74. See also Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 461 (discussing other specific instances
of alleged agency capture).
Studies of agencies as diverse as the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Federal
Maritime Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, and the
Interstate Commerce Commission found evidence of capture. Although the
studies may have overestimated the influence on agency staff of
opportunities for jobs in regulated industries, they consistently found that
agencies harbored biases in favor of focused interest groups affected by
agency decisions.
Id.
75. See Wiley, supra note 28, at 726.
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dominant private interest. So, while no "smoking gun" has been
provided, and some plausible alternative explanations for the
regulatory choices remain, we are left with the strong (and
justifiable) suspicion that safer meat, guns, power plants, and a
myriad of other public goods have been systematically sacrificed to
the various relevant private interests, most often the profit motives of
the industry representatives that wield the hyper-influence within
agencies, by an array of agencies charged with the responsibility to
regulate and control those interests.
The question that the remainder of this Article will address is
whether in the area of airline security there is similar compelling
evidence that the FAA has lost its public focus and has focused undue
attention on the private interests of its regulated community,
providing supportive (if, again, not conclusive) evidence of the
various allegations that it has been captured.
II. AGENCY CAPTURE AND THE FAA
As noted above, it can be difficult to determine exactly which
administrative entities might be suffering from the effects of agency
capture, and exactly how extensive the impact of any such capture is
at any given time. The mere accusation that an agency is subject to
the hyper-influence of private interests is, of course, insufficient by
itself to demonstrate that agency capture has occurred. Evidence
that would provide conclusive proof of the phenomenon is difficult
even to imagine, let alone gather. One is unlikely to see a
presentation by a federal agency of an award for "most influential
lobbying group of the year" or a memo from an agency official to a
prominent industry representative thanking the representative for
the useful instructions concerning the agency's activities for the year,
and requesting guidance for the year to come. Consequently,
observers who have sought to identify and examine instances of
agency capture have relied primarily on an analysis of the regulatory
and enforcement structure that the agency has applied to its relevant
industries in order to determine where such structures might favor
the private interests of the regulated parties at the expense of the
broader public interest.
Certainly, one instance of any agency action which can be
demonstrated to have favored private interests above those of the
public as a whole would be indicative of agency capture. But, such an
action could also be motivated by any number of other factors (such
as the agency's honest miscalculation of the impact of the action, or
other kinds of error). Evidence of repeated instances of decision-
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making favoring private interests, however, or an identifiable trend of
such decisions in a particular agency would provide a more sound
basis for a conclusion that a private interest group has and continues
to wield some kind of controlling influence on an agency.
Acknowledgment of such a pattern or trend by another government
body with some kind of relevant expertise would further support an
agency capture conclusion.
In order to test the various allegations that the FAA has been
captured by the airline industry, this Article will provide a brief
summary of the history of the agency. It will also review its portfolio
and basic regulatory and enforcement structure, which relies
extensively on the self-monitoring of regulated groups. It will also
note the sharp criticism of the agency's record of regulating the
safety of air travel by the National Transportation Safety Board, the
government entity responsible for investigating airline accidents.
Finally, it will summarize some of the concerns raised about the
influence of the airline industry on FAA policy-making raised by
courts over the past few decades. The combination of these factors
will provide support for the argument that the FAA has consistently
promoted the interests of the airline industry at the expense of the
broader public interest, including airline safety and security.
A. History and Regulatory Structure of the FAA
The first federal regulations of non-military air travel in the United
States came in the nascent days of aviation. The Air Commerce Act
of 1926 vested regulatory authority over navigable airspace in the
Department of Commerce, the President, the Department of
Defense, and the various states.76 In 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Act
created the Civil Aeronautics Authority effectively consolidating this
diffuse regulatory authority into one federal agency. 7 Two years
76. See Matthew J. Kelly, Federal Preemption by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49
CATH. U. L. REV. 873, 875-76 (2000) (discussing early federal aviation regulation).
77. See Jeffrey M. Jakubiak, Maintaining Air Safety at Less Cost, 6 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 421 (1997) (stating "although the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 fell short
of openly declaring exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government over air
transportation... there was very little left for the states to do in aviation except,
perhaps, establish and maintain airports, and cooperate with the Federal
Government."). See also Jeff Mosteller, The Current and Future Climate of Airline
Consolidation, 64 J. AIR L. & CoM. 575, 577 (1999) (discussing the motivations behind
the passage of the 1938 Act).
Congress intended to protect the young industry from excessive competition
while also maintaining a certain level of rivalry to promote efficiency.
Congress chose to regulate the young industry after noting the pre-
regulation rise of barons in the railroad industry. Regulation of the airline
industry was designed to avoid the deleterious consequences of cutthroat
and excessive competition, and thereby enhance economic stability, safety,
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later, the Authority was divided into the Civil Aeronautics Board
("CAB") and the Civil Aeronautics Administration (" CAA"), giving
the former economic regulatory authority over things like airline
fares and market entry, while the latter was authorized to promulgate
regulations on airline safety. 8 In 1958, the Federal Aviation Act was
signed into law reorganizing the former CAA into the new Federal
Aviation Agency ("FAA") ."9 The CAB and the new FAA both had the
status of "independent" regulatory agencies, with the former
retaining the authority to regulate the economic consequences of
civil aviation, while the latter was authorized to promulgate
regulations concerning civil air safety. 80
In 1966, the Transportation Act was enacted, creating the U.S.
Department of Transportation, transferring the FAA under the
auspices of the new Department, and consequently, the Executive
Branch,8' and creating "a comprehensive scheme of federal
government regulation regarding interstate air transportation." 8
The FAA retained its acronym (although "Agency" was changed to
"Administration") and its authority to regulate the safety of civil air
travel.3 However, the new statute provided a critical new imperative
to the agency, to "foster air commerce." 8 This additional imperative
has had a profound impact on the development of the FAA and its
administrative functions over the past four decades.
From its inception, the FAA was given the difficult task of
balancing two interests which might be frequently, if not inherently,
in conflict: the protection of airline safety on one hand, and the
"fostering" of successful air commerce, and consequently, the
promotion of airline profitability, on the other.85 The complications
and the sound growth and development of this young industry.
Id.
78. See Mosteller, supra note 77, at 424.
79. See ROBERT BURKHARDT, THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 25 (1967).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Donald J. Frenette, Avoiding Preemption Under the Airline Deregulations Act, 17
Miss. C. L. REV. 171, 173 (1996).
83. Burkhardt, supra note 79, at vii.
84. Frenette, supra note 82, at 173.
85.
[Tihe FAA is not only faced with internal conflicts of interest, but it also
creates conflicts of interest in airlines and in aircraft manufacturers. For
example, the FAA is charged under the Federal Aviation Act with the often
competing goals of promoting air safety and encouraging the development
of civil aeronautics and air commerce.
Jakubiak, supra note 77, at 422.
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created by this "dual mandate" have not escaped the attention of
legal commentators, the mainstream media,88 or former President
Clinton's Secretary of Transportation, Frederico Pefia, who called on
Congress to "reexamine the FAA's 'dual mandate.'" These concerns
led to an amendment to the Transportation Act, which removed the
"promoting" language, and provided more emphasis on safety. The
new language, however, did not provide any structural changes to the
FAA's mandate, such as, removing some of the FAA's existing
authority and transferring it to another agency.8 Indeed, the express
intent of Congress concerning the amendment was to address the
public perception that the FAA was insufficiently committed to strict
regulation of the airlines, but not to change the scope of its authority
or functions in any substantial way.88
The history of the FAA, like that of many regulatory agencies, has
been marked by periods of regulatory zeal. More than twenty years
of relatively strict regulatory oversight, a period characterized by
one expert as being defined by "a somewhat protectionist
arrangement" between the CAB and the airlines,9 was followed by
86. For an exemplary list of media discussions of the FAA's "dual mandate," see
SUN SENTINEL, June 6, 1999, at Gl; PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, Apr. 6, 1999, at A8;
TIME MAG., Jan. 26, 1998, at 6; PEORIA J. STAR, June 30, 1996, at A6; AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, June 26, 1996; CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 24, 1996, at 20.
87. See Lea Ann Carlisle, The FAA v. the NTSB: Now that Congress has Addresses the
Federal Aviation Administration's "Dual Mandate," Has the FAA Begun Living up to its
Amended Purpose of Making Air Travel Safer, or Is the National Transportation Safety Board
Still Doing its Job AloneZ 66 J. Air L. & Com. 741, 755 (2001) (explaining the passage
of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996).
On October 9, 1996 Congress passed Public Law 104-264, also known as the
Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, which addressed and
amended various troublesome provisions of the statute governing the
aviation industry. Basically, all this did was change the word from
'promoting' to 'encouraging' aviation, while inserting a few safety concerns.
Id.
88. Public Law 104-264 included a kind of disclaimer as to the intended impact
of the provision:
We do not intend for the enactment of this provision to require any changes
in the FAA's current organization or functions. Instead, the provision is
intended to address any public perceptions.., that promotion of air
commerce by the FAA could create a conflict with its safety ... mandate.
Carlisle, supra note 87, at 756 (quoting Mary Schiavo, Mary Schiavo's Safety Wish List,
AIR SAFETY WK., May 18, 1998).
89. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1211, at 1-2 (1978) (reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3737)
(observing that airlines were "subject to extensive economic regulation by the CAB"
and did not enjoy "the same control over basic operational decisions as management
in other industries").
90.
The CAB disfavored the demise of a major airline or the creation of a new
airline. The CAB promoted this policy by "handicapping" the competition:
it expected airlines to use some of their profits from lucrative routes to
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the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978, which
"significantly alter[ed] the regulatory atmosphere of the airline
industry" that existed up to that time.9' The provision sought to
reconcile the inherent tensions in the FAA's dual mission by seeking
to "encourage, develop, and attain an air transportation system
which relies on competitive market forces to determine the quality,
variety, and price of air services and for other purposes." 92 It also
served to further complicate the FAA's dual-role problem by
transferring portions of the CAB's authority over direct economic
regulations of airlines to the FAA.
The FAA's regulatory mandate and policy have been impacted by
various factors during the past few decades. In addition to its dual
mandate, the FAA has been impacted, perhaps most dramatically, by
instances of airline fatalities and the resulting public and
governmental reaction to them. For example, in response to the
crash of TWA flight 800 off the coast of Long Island, which raised
ultimately unsubstantiated concerns about the role of terrorism in
the accident,93 the FAA implemented several heightened safety
measures9 and organized a White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security.9 On February 12, 1997, forty-five days after it was
convened, the Commission, chaired by then Vice-President Al Gore
(known, as the "Gore Commission") offered fifty-seven proposals for
subsidize marginal routs while providing weaker airlines with enough routes
to keep them from failing. This practice proved effective from promoting
the policy as almost all major airlines survived the regulation period, and no
new airlines were created.
Mosteller, supra note 77, at 577-78.
91. Frenette, supra note 82, at 174.
92. Frenette, supra note 82, at 174.
The theory behind the legislation was that air carriers would provide better
services and lower fares for passengers through free entry into and
expansion in the system, whereas the detailed regulatory procedures had
restricted this in the past. The main expectations regarding deregulation of
the airline industry included the following: (1) improved service to the
public, (2) lower air fares, (3) higher profits for carriers, and (4) a more
competitive commercial airline industry.
Id. (quoting ROBERT M. KAvE & ALLEN D. VOSE, AIR TRANSPORTATION 12-17 (10th ed.
1987)).
93. See Kenneth M. Mead, AvIATION SECURITY TECH., Oct. 11, 2001 (statement of
Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General U.S. Department of Transportation, before the
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on
Aviation), available at 2001 WL 26187120.
94. See Robert W. Hahn, The Economics of Airline Safety and Security: An Analysis of
the White House Commission's Recommendations, 20 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 791, 792
(1997).
95. Id.
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improvements to commercial aviation safety, and security96 These
proposals included setting a national goal of reducing the airline
accident rate by eighty percent within a decade and accelerating the
development of the National Airspace Systems modernization. In
addition, the Commission proposed thirty-one recommendations for
tightening airport and airline security, notwithstanding its
acknowledgment that "although the threat of terrorism is increasing,
the danger of an individual becoming a victim of a terrorist attack -
let alone an aircraft bombing - will doubtless remain very small." 97
Of these recommendations, seven had the most direct potential
impact on the FAA and its regulatory portfolio,9s including:
requirements for airport vulnerability assessments; deployment of
rigorous background checking systems for both passengers, airline
and airport employees; deployment of existing but unused security
technology and the expanded use of bomb sniffing dogs;
establishment of a joint government-industry research and
development program; certification of security screening companies
and aggressive testing of screener systems and performance;
providing key airline and airport personnel access to classified
information; and implementing full bag-match requirements. 99
Immediately following the recommendations, the FAA began the
process of promulgating regulations00 to implement some of the
recommendations and initiated studies or other preparatory activities
in regard to others.1 'O
As of September 11, 2001, however, most observers agreed that the
agency had made little progress in implementing the new
procedures, ' °z and indeed, that "had those recommendations been
96. Id.
97. Id. at 795-96 (quoting WHITE HOUSE COMM. ON AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY,
FINAL REPORTTO PRESIDENT CLINTON 23 (1997)).
98. Various recommendations involved functions of the FBI and other law
enforcement entities, or applied directly to private air carriers. See Hahn, supra note
94, at Table 1.
99. See id.
100. Indeed, there is an indication that the FAA was prepared to issue regulations
implementing some of the Gore Commission recommendations during the week of
September 17, 2001. See George Leopold, FAA Security Regulations were in Motion,
ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING TIMES, Sept. 17, 2001, at 112.
101. See Hahn, supra note 94, at Table 1.
102.
The FAA has failed to carry out the major recommendations regarding
aviation security. Our commission required 'that the Secretary of
Transportation report publicly each year on the implementation status of
these recommendations.' There has been no report since 1998. The
Transportation Department's inspector general has repeatedly commented
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implemented within the spirit and intent of the commission, the
plans to attack on September 11 might have been detected well
before they occurred."'03  Specifically, some argue, quicker
implementation of passenger and airport employee screening
recommendations 0'4 might have identified the September 11
hijackers as potentially dangerous, or identified possible accomplices
working for airlines or airports. 1°5 Furthermore, no progress had
apparently been made by September 11 in the development of
certification and evaluation procedures for security screening
companies employed by airlines to provide airport security checks. '°6
on the FAA's inadequacies in background checks and airport access controls
.... The TWA 800 accident was indeed tragic, so much so that it produced
a presidential commission. But once that tragedy was ruled an accident -
not a terrorist attack - the sense of urgency passed. The FAA returned to
business as usual, the commission's recommendations on security all but
ignored.
General John Michael Loh (ret.), Viewpoint, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 8,
2001.
103. Id. ("Few of the recommendations have been fully put into practice. The
remainder have either not been implemented at all, or only partially, and with no
significant impact on security.").
104. For criticism of the Gore Commission recommendations, specifically those
involving background checks and screening of passengers, see Michael J. AuBuchon,
Choosing How Safe is Enough: Increased AntiTerrorist Federal Activity and its Effect on the
General Public and the Airport/Airline Industry, 64J. AIRL. & CoM. 891, 901-02 (1999).
Attacks on the Gore Commission's recommendation have come from several
fronts. One such front includes scholars concerned about the constitutional
problems associated with the use of state-of-the-art bomb-screening
technology. Invasion of privacy issues have surfaced because some of the
bomb-screeners enable the operator to see through a person's clothing to
his or her naked body.
The Gore Commission's recommended use of passenger profiling perhaps
gives rise to the most heated constitutional debate ... . Other privacy
interests could be violated through passenger profiling, such as the right not
to have a criminal record exposed to nongovernment aviation personnel.
Moreover, the use of profiles can potentially single out an individual in a
discriminatory manner; for example, a profile would be discriminatory if it
unfoundedly singled out Arab or Muslim Americans as a group likely to pose
a terrorist threat.
Id.
105. See AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 8, 2001, at 94. See also NPR: All Things
Considered, Oct. 5, 2001 (recapping Jerry Kavar, Senior Analyst at the Rand
Corporation and former Gore Committee member, noting that one of the major
flaws in airline security "is the failure of the government at large to integrate the law
enforcement information together and pass it to the FAA, which could then pass it to
the airlines. The government simply failed to implement the recommendations of
the commission."), available at 2001 WL 9436693.
106. AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., supra note 105. See also Mike McAndrew, Many
Security Suggestions Put on Shelf Herald AM., Sept. 23, 2001, at A9.
The FAA still allows airlines to hire private security firms that pay workers
barely above minimum wage to screen passengers and luggage for weapons;
screener turnover is 100% to 400% at some airports; and screener training
remains below the standards in many foreign countries, according to the
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Others contend that there is a direct connection between the
failure to implement the recommendations of the Gore Commission,
and the influence of the air travel industry over both Congress and
the FAA." 7  Noting the consistent animosity on the part of air
industry lobbyists to any regulatory change that might affect profits,
one industry observer noted that industry influence played a role in
muting the impact of the Gore Commission's recommendations:
For example, according to a report by Public Citizen, the
commission's recommendation that the background of all airport
employees be checked for criminal records was opposed by the
industry because it would create administrative and financial
burdens. Even Gore himself backed down on his commission's
insistence that all bags be matched to passengers on all flights.
The day after he wrote the ATA [Air Transportation Association]
about his change of heart, campaign contributions started to pour
in from the airlines to various Democratic Party committees at
double their previous pace.108
B. The "Dual Mandate"
The FAA's dual mandate, to the extent that its vestiges have
survived the cosmetic amendment to the language of its enabling act,
creates fertile ground for the development of agency capture.
Indeed, it could be argued that the agency is obliged by the
"promotional" half of its mandate to take the interests, and
presumably, therefore, the expressly communicated concerns, of the
airline industry into account far more than most agencies are
required to do, and that some form of agency capture was all but
preordained when Congress gave the agency its role in 1958. Various
observers have noted that:
These conflicting purposes are an obvious problem once one
realizes that for every proposed safety regulation, the FAA must
weigh the cost of implementation and determine if it is worth the
financial strain on the airlines. More often than not, the FAA
decided the change was not worth the financial cost....'09
U.S. General Accounting Office.
Id.
107. See generally Hahn, supra note 94.
108. Micah L. Sifry, Boodle & Airline Security, THE NATION, Oct. 29, 2001, at 5-6.
109. Carlisle, supra note 87, at 741. Indeed, if one were looking for a real culprit
in any "capture" scenario involving the FAA, it might be reasonable to begin here,
with Congress, and the structural limitations it has placed on any attempts the
agency might want to make to challenge the private interests of its regulated
community. Id. But the broader influence of the airline industry (or other
intersected parties) on the process of legislation, although referenced below, is not
the main focus of this article, which seeks instead to determine what role such
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One salient apparent consequence of the FAA's dual mandate has
been its extensive reliance on the private entities it regulates. These
entities play a significant role in monitoring industry activities, from
airplane construction, to airline safety, to airport and airplane
security. Such a structure allows the specific mechanisms for the
enforcement of safety regulations to be determined by the regulated
parties, which in turn, allows them to make decisions regarding these
mechanisms that will enhance their profitability. While this
delegation of authority certainly results in additional costs for the
private entities (for example, hiring of private inspectors and
contract employees for airport security), the costs are in the exclusive
control of the companies, and are not imposed upon them in the
form of taxes or fees by a government bureaucracy obliged to find
some way to pay for the performance its obligations.
Agency use, or even reliance, on this kind of "audited" self-
regulation by private parties is widespread, and is insufficient on its
own to demonstrate an instance of agency capture. But, as will be
discussed more fully below, a regulatory regime that relies almost
exclusively on self-regulation provides an ample opportunity for
hyper-influence by regulated parties. In addition, an agency's
continued reliance on self-regulation even in the face of repeated
indications that the system is an ineffective regulatory device strongly
suggests that something other than the public interest is being served
by the continued use of the regime.1
In 1984, in the case of United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Arerea
Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines),"' a group of family members of
passengers killed in a 1973 crash of a Boeing 707 jet 2 and the airline
brought a federal tort action against the CAB (the predecessor
agency of the FAA) in which the plaintiffs challenged the
effectiveness of a regulatory scheme that relied heavily on self-
regulation. In this case, a fire had started on the Varig jet during a
flight. Although the pilot managed to land the plane successfully,
124 of the 135 passengers suffocated or were poisoned to death by
113toxic gas. The fire apparently started in the towel disposal area of
influence has at the agency level, even within the complex parameters that Congress
has provided for the FAA. Id.
110. See Stephen J. Hedges et al., What's Wrong with the FAA? The FAA is Supposed to
Police Commercial Aviation, But the Agency Still Refuses to Act Like a Tough Cop on the Beat,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 26, 1995, at 29-30 (noting how FAA regulations
frequently go unenforced).
111. 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
112. Seeid.at800.
113. Id.
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the lavatory."'
In 1958, the CAB had reviewed the specifications for the 707 and
had approved the design as meeting the applicable "minimum safety
standards" pursuant to the Aviation Act.15 The plaintiffs argued that
the CAB had erred in making this safety determination. Specifically,
they argued that applicable air safety regulations required that trash
cans be made of fire-resistant materials and be able to contain fires.
The CAB had been negligent, according to the plaintiffs, when it
inspected the 707 and issued a certificate stating that it complied with
the fire protection standards.
6
The district court granted the United States' motion to dismiss the
case, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the CAB could
be found liable in tort for its inspection errors." 7  Ultimately,
however, the Supreme Court held that the actions of the agency were
covered by the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act ("FTCA"), based, in a large part, on the extensive
freedom that had been given to the agency by Congress to carry out
its regulatory mission, and the fact that the agency had chosen,
within the boundaries of this discretion, to leave much of the
responsibility for safety inspection to the private parties it
regulated.1
8
After reviewing the Aviation Act, the Supreme Court concluded
that while Congress had required the FAA to take certain specific
steps to ensure air safety, it had also granted the Secretary of
Transportation "discretion to prescribe reasonable rules and
regulations governing the inspection of aircraft including the
manner in which such inspections should be made." "9 Congress had
made it clear that the FAA was not the only body responsible for
monitoring the safety of planes - that "air carriers themselves
retained certain responsibilities to promote the public interest in air
safety and the duty to perform their services with the highest degree
of safety." 1"0 The plaintiffs had based their allegation of negligence
114. Id. at 798.
115. Id. at 800.
116. Id. at 801.
117. See S.A. Empresa de Viacao Arerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S. at 798.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 804.
120. Id.
[T]he FAA has promulgated a comprehensive set of regulations delineating
the minimum safety standards with which the designers and manufactures of
aircraft must comply before marketing their products ... FAA employees or
their representatives evaluate materials submitted by aircraft manufactures
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on both the "spot-checking" safety review system, and the
implementation of that system.'2' But while the court held that the
discretionary function exception to the FTCA applied to shield the
United States from liability in the case, it said nothing about how a
different system, which relied more on direct government inspection,
might have affected the crash at issue in this case, or the safety of
American air travel in general.
In another case involving the predecessor to the FAA, Moss v.
CAB,' the D.C. Circuit addressed more directly the relationship
between the agency's dual mandate and its specific regulatory
decisions and the phenomenon of agency capture. In addressing a
claim filed by thirty-two members of Congress alleging that the CAB
excluded public comments when it approved airfare increases
proposed by the airlines, the court noted that the case presented:
[t] he recurring question which has plagued public regulation of
the industry: whether the regulatory agency is unduly oriented
toward the interests of the industry it is designed to regulate, rather
than the public interest it is designed to protect.123
The court noted that after finding that the new rates proposed by
the airlines "might be unjust or unreasonable and ordering an
investigation, the Board went on... to point out that, because of the
need for revenue which the carriers had shown, the Board would 'be
disposed to grant an increase... , 124 In discussing the Board's
ultimate approval of the rates, the court discussed both the airline
influence with the CAB, and the fact that the "Board concededly
took this action after closed session with carrier representatives,
without statutory public hearing and, according to petitioners,
without reference to the rate-making standards of the statute.""-'
In addition, the court noted that the authorizing statute cannot
reasonably be read to allow "the Board to deal only with the carriers
and disregard the other factors, such as the traveling public's interest
in the lowest possible fair and high standards of service, which are
also enumerated in the Act as rate-making criteria."' 26 Expanding on
this point, the court stated that:
to determine whether the manufacturer has satisfied these regulatory
requirements
Id. at 805.
121. See id. at 815.
122. 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
123. Id. at 893.
124. Id. at 896.
125. Id. at 900.
126. Id.
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In any case, ignoring the general public's interest in order to better
serve the carriers is not the proper response to the difficulties
supposedly created by an outdated or unwieldy statutory
procedure. After all, there is more to rate-making than providing
carriers with sufficient revenue to meet their obligation to their
creditors and their stockholders .... We fully recognized that a
carrier's exigent economic circumstances at times will make it
necessary for the Board to act on the basis of incomplete data. But
we emphatically reject any intimation by the Board that its
responsibilities to the carriers are more important than its
responsibilities to the public. Board action must always comply
with the procedural requirements of the statute and must always be
based on any assessment of the relevant available data, with due
consideration given to all the factors enumerated in the statute,
which factors taken together make up the public interest.12
7
Based on its conclusion about the role played by the air carriers in
the rate approval process, and failure of the Board to properly
balance its interest in ensuring the profitability of the airline industry
with its broader interest in public access to affordable and high-
quality service, the court remanded the determination back to the
Board for further proceedings and required that the statutory
provisions for public notice and participation be followed. '28
In addition to federal courts, other outside observers have
consistently noted the negative impact of the FAA's dual mandate on
its policy decisions and on its mission to protect the "public interest."
The National Transportation Safety Board, the most persistent of
these government observers of the agency, has repeatedly raised
these concerns over the past few decades.
C. The FAA and the Public Interest
1. The NTSB vs. the FAA
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an
independent investigatory agency created in 1967 to investigate civil
aviation accidents in the United States.129 Somewhat surprisingly,
given the FAA's mandate to regulate airline safety, the NTSB is not
affiliated with the FAA or the Department of Transportation.130
Indeed, the two entities have a notably adversarial relationship
127. Id. at 901-02.
128. Moss, 430 F.2d at 902. See also United States v. CAB, 511 F.2d 1315 (1975).
129. See Carlisle, supra note 87, at 756.
130. See id. at 756.
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characterized by a frequent reluctance on the part of the FAA to
accept and implement safety recommendations made by the NTSB
arising out of its investigation of accidents or near accidents. This
reluctance invariably was born not from a dispute over the efficacy of
the proposed changes, but over their cost of implementation.
From 1967 to 1999, the NTSB, in the course of its ongoing
investigation of transportation accidents, issued 11,161 safety
recommendations - 3,703 of these were air safety recommendations
made to the FAA' While the FAA had a relatively high rate of
acceptance of these recommendations (83.2 percent), the instances
where the agency failed to implement recommended changes, and
perhaps more importantly, the reasons generally given for the failure
to implement, suggest strong influence over its regulatory policy on
the part of the airline industry, and the promotion of the private
interests of the industry at the possible expense of the broad public
interest in airline safety.
32
One example of an unheeded recommendation by the NTSB, and
its unfortunate consequences, is the NTSB's 1975 admonition that
commercial airlines be equipped with smoke detectors. ' 3 In 1984, a
fire in a lavatory in an Air Canada jet flying over Kentucky resulted in
the deaths of twenty-three passengers, and in the agency's belated
acceptance of an earlier NTSB recommendation that smoke
detectors be required in all new planes.'3 When the NTSB made a
related recommendation in 1988 that a similar requirement should
be applied to older model planes currently in use for commercial
aviation, the FAA failed to require the installation.'3 The 1996 crash
of a Valujet plane in the Florida Everglades was caused by a fire that
apparently started in the cargo hold, and about which the flight crew
seemed to have no warning. In its post-investigation report, the
NTSB reiterated its strong concern that "a fire should not be allowed
to persist in any state of intensity in an airplane without the
knowledge of the flight crew." "6The FAA's decision to reject both of
the NTSB's initial smoke detector recommendations was determined
by a congressional investigation to have resulted from the agency s
131. Id. at 758-59.
132. Various observers of aviation law and commerce have suggested that the FAA
too often undervalues the concern for protecting human life in comparison to
airline industry profits, and that by "rejecting NTSB recommendations, the FAA has
repeatedly weighed economics over safety concerns." Id. at 746.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Carlisle, supra note 87, at 746.
136. Id. at 755.
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belief that "the gain in safety would not justify the cost of requiring
all aircraft to install such systems." 137
Various examples of a similar pattern of response to NTSB
recommendations, in which the FAA first rejects an NTSB
recommendation only to later implement it in the wake of a deadly
accident, have been cited over the past few decades. Most examples,
involve de-icing procedures, radar and lighting on runways, and
design flaws in aircraft (specifically, the McDonnell Douglas MD-11
and its "slat" design).'3a In all of these instances the reason given by
the FAA for the rejection of the prior safety recommendation was the
conclusion that the benefit of additional safety procedures was
outweighed by the cost of their implementation.1 39
As a result of these and other instances of FAA reluctance to
implement possible solutions for identifiable safety threats, the NTSB
has included FAA regulatory reluctance in its causation analysis of
various airline accidents. In its report on a Coin Air flight crash in
Covington, Kentucky, the NTSB listed as some of the causes of the
accident:
The Federal Aviation Administration's failure to establish adequate
aircraft certification standards for flight in icing conditions, the
FAA's failure to ensure that a[n] FAA-approved procedure for the
accident airplane's de-ice system operation was implemented by
U.S.-based carriers, and the FAA's failure to require the
establishment of adequate minimum airspeeds for icing
conditions, which led to the loss of control when the airplane
accumulated a thin, rough accretion of ice on its lifting surfaces. 4
In the aftermath of the Valujet disaster, the NTSB noted the
137. Id. at 755. For a discussion of the practical economic impact and other
consequences of additional airline safety requirements, see Hahn, supra note 94, at
793.
Each measure to improve safety and security can increase the direct costs to
travelers, cause delays and inconvenience, infringe on civil liberties, increase
taxpayer costs, and even increase fatalities. For example, using high-tech
machines may detect some explosives in checked luggage, but the devices
are costly and far from foolproof. Requiring airlines to match each bag to a
passenger may reduce the threat of a 'drop-and-run' terrorist tactic, but it
could cause lengthy delays and inconvenience. Using computer background
checks to identify suspected terrorists could enhance security at a reasonable
cost, but it would also curtail individual freedoms. Mandating child safety
seats will secure infants during air travel, but the higher costs could lead to
an increase in automobile travel and highway fatalities.
Id.
138. Carlisle, supra note 87, at 746-50.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 747-48 (quoting Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Safety Recommendation A-98-
88 through -106, at 1).
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crucial role that a smoke detector, which it had recommended in the
DC-9 eight years earlier, might have played in avoiding the accident,
which killed 110 individuals. This report, along with the agency's
disturbing history of regulation of the initially successful airline
company,"' led the FAA Administrator to acknowledge that "yes, we
bear some responsibility in this case.""'
The unavoidable public concern produced by official government
acknowledgments of the critical deficiencies of another government
entity brought extensive public attention to potential problems with
the FAA and its role in protecting airline safety even before the
Valujet crash. In preparation for a 1995 article discussing the
effectiveness of FAA air safety regulations, U.S. News and World
Report performed a three-month examination of the agency's
enforcement activities, focusing on four areas in particular: (1)
certification of new airplanes, (2) pilot fatigue, (3) use of un-
approved parts in airline repair, and (4) safety inspections.13 In the
course of its investigation, the magazine identified significant
criticisms of the agency's safety enforcement record by the NTSB.
Addressing a rash of airline accidents in 1994 - one accident in
particular that involved a pilot who had been dismissed by one airline
based on concerns about his ability to handle pressure situations,
only to be hired soon thereafter by another carrier - the article
notes that:
In that case, the federal investigators place some of the
responsibility on the FAA. The agency had been urged to impose
stricter screening requirements on pilots; FAA officers declined to
do so. In a total of five crashes last year, the NTSB indicated that
the FAA had fallen short, either failing to enforce its own rules or
siding with airlines to oppose what many pilots and passengers
considered sensible reform.14
Specific instances of FAA regulatory activity which raised the
concerns of both the NTSB, and officials within the agency itself, and
141. See Carlisle, supra note 87, at 752-55 (discussing the FAA's failure to respond
to repeated instances of safety violations by the fast-growing airline, including
hundreds of emergency landings, overshooting of runways, landing gear mishaps,
engine explosions, communication breakdowns between airplanes and air traffic
control, sudden depressurization during flight, and the use of duct tape to fix certain
spots on planes). Carlisle also points out the FAA's initial attempts after the accident
to argue that "all airlines were safe, and that there was nothing wrong with Valujet."
Id. at 754.
142. Carlisle, supra note 87, at 754 (quoting MARY SCHIAVO, FLYING BLIND, FLYING
SAFE 45 (1998)).
143. Hedges, supra note 110, at 29.
144. Id.
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which support the argument that agency decisions were invariably
motivated more by the goal of promoting airline profitability than by
safety concerns, include its exemption of Boeing's new wide-body 777
from otherwise required tests of engine thrust reversers.'45 The FAA
also failed to enforce "routine" rules concerning pilot flying time,1
6
to reassign FAA safety inspectors after apparent complaints from
airlines about the performance of their duties, and to require flight
approval for several airlines with long histories of safety and other
violations.
48
145. See id.
The FAA also certified the plane just days after resolving engineers' concerns
about the possibility of dangerous vibrations on the plane's two massive
turbine engines. The issue was settled without certain tests that FAA
engineers had request. Indeed, Boeing submitted data from earlier tests.
Id.
146. See id. ("Pilots routinely report falling asleep in the cockpit and making
mistakes while landing, taking off and navigating their planes."). Apparently,
concerns about the thrust reversers were not identified randomly. Id.
The 777 was still a concept in the computer when a Boeing 767 flown by
Australian-based Lauda Air fell from the sky near Bangkok, Thailand, in
1991, killing all 223 people aboard. The Lauda 767 crashed because one of
the plane's thrust reversers deployed inadvertently 15 minutes after takeoff,
sending the plane into a dive.
See Hedges, supra note 110, at 31. Ultimately, top FAA officials overruled FAA
engineers who objected to Boeing's proposals for how the new 777's thrust reversers
could be approved without a flight test, and the agency approved the plane for
commercial use. Id.
147. See id.
One inspector was transferred after she reported that five pilots flying for
Alaska Airlines had falsified training records. After a brief lapse, the pilots
were all allowed to keep flying .... In dozens of interviews, inspectors say...
their superiors often prevent them from doing theirjobs. In 1993, May Rose
Diefenderfer found herself at the center of such a storm. The FAA's
principal operations inspector for Alaska Airlines, she had discovered that
five of its top pilots, including the vice president of flight operations, were
flying without current training or had falsified training records. Not trusting
her supervisor, Diefenderfer contacted the FAA's security branch. An
investigation confirmed her suspicions. But when Diefenderfer's bosses
found out about the case, they reassigned her. A former airline pilot with
more than 4,000 hours in DC-9's, Diefenderfer was transferred to a desk job
answering public document requests. She got her old post back - after
threatening to sue. But the FAA chose not to follow her recommendation
FAA guidelines. Instead of revoking the pilots' licenses, FAA supervisors let
four of them fly as copilots and, after a year, as captains. Only the vice
president's pilot certificate was suspended - for three months.
Id.
148. See id.
In 1990, the FAA let the owner of Northeast Jet, an executive jet service in
Allentown, Pa., resume charter service just 20 months after yanking the
carrier's operating certificate. Two years later, the owner and two FAA
inspectors were indicted on charges related to falsified Northeast Jet records.
In Miami last month, the FAA let Arrow Air, a cargo hauler that also did
passenger charters, resume flying after it agreed to a $1.5 million fine for
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Each of these instances provide evidence not merely of agency
laxity or insufficient diligence, but of an agency structure that gives
substantial weight to the economic impact of regulatory activities on
the regulated parties in comparison to other factors. Indeed, the
FAA's approval process for a new wide-body airline that proved to
produce substantial profits for two of the most influential members
of its regulatory community, and the failure to consistently enforce
pilot time restrictions,'4 9 certainly provide strong circumstantial
evidence of extensive influence of, if not capture, by this community.
Furthermore, the allegations of reassignment of inspectors because
they were too critical of airlines, and the approval of the commercial
flight of airlines that had demonstrated histories of safety violations
(particularly under circumstances where agency officials have
allegedly been involved in falsification of documentation), if true, of
course, would provide something more akin to direct evidence of
hyper-influence, if not, again, capture itself. Although these
instances do not provide the imaginary "smoking-gun"
correspondence between agency and controlling private entity, they
raise very serious questions, as demonstrated by comments from FAA
inspectors, who,
say they frequently encounter pressure from supervisors, and from
the FAA's Washington headquarters, when they question the safety
of a plane, a pilot, repairs or training methods. 'If we try to ground
an airplane belonging to a major airline, we know that the airline's
CEO is going to pick up the phone and call,' says one inspector,
assigned to an airline in Texas. 'It is almost a given.'150
Some version of this argument appears to have convinced many
officials of the NTSB not only of problems in FAA's safety regulation,
but of the fact that those problems are directly related to the undue
influence wielded at the agency by the airline industry.''
thousands of airworthiness violations.
Id.
149. See Hedges, supra note 110, at 33-34.
One big change the FAA faces today is the phenomenal growth of commuter
and regional airlines. In the past five years, such airlines have grown by 50
percent, carrying more than 57 million people in 1994. Controlling costs for
smaller airlines is often a matter of life and death. They do that through
longer hours for crews and low pay. The former raises a key safety concern:
pilot fatigue.
Id.
150. Id.
151. As the relationship between the FAA and the NTSB was articulated in an
editorial in the Washington Post.
FAA Chief David R. Hinson's response to questions about the FAA's safety
oversight is too glib: 'When we say an airline is safe to fly, it is safe to fly.
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2. Other Indicia of Regulatory Effectiveness
Another possible source of empirical data concerning the
effectiveness of the FAA in fulfilling its role as regulator of the
nation's air travel is its record of ensuring compliance by its
regulatory community with applicable regulations. Perhaps even
more illuminating would be data concerning how the agency
responded when it became clear that its regulations were not being
properly enforced.
Much of the FAA's actual regulatory function involves monitoring
and inspection of airlines and airports to determine whether both
entities are fulfilling their extensive security responsibilities. The
available data demonstrate that FAA inspections routinely uncover
dangerous levels of non-compliance and ineffectiveness that can only
be characterized as catastrophic. However, no significant changes,
either in the nature of the authority given to the air travel industry
for ensuring security or in the regulations or regulatory structure of
the agency, have resulted from these realizations. This phenomenon
provides further support for the conclusion that effective regulation
within the airline industry in promotion of the public interest is less
of a priority for the FAA than ensuring that the industry be provided
with an atmosphere where it can thrive financially. While delegation
of authority for self-regulation to private parties is not in and of itself
an indication of favoring private interests over public ones, the
continued reliance on such a structure, even when it becomes clear
that it is ineffective, does suggest a strong preference for private
control (and the private benefits that flow from it) at the expense of
effective regulatory enforcement.
The Inspector General of the Department of Transportation
performs periodic inspections and tests to evaluate the level of
compliance by air carriers and airports with FAA safety and security
regulations. Between December 1998 and May 1999, the Inspector
General's office conducted approximately 173 tests at eight U.S.
airports focusing on compliance with security provisions. During
these tests, the investigators gained unauthorized access to either the
There is no gray area.' What kind of area is it that has prompted the
National Transportation Safety Board to raise questions over the years about
the FAA's response to pressures from airlines? For example, when the board
recommended that better smoke detection devices and extinguisher systems
be mandatory in certain cargo compartments, what was the response? Too
costly. Too costly for what? For devices that might save lives? Or too costly
for some airlines to support? Along these lines, why is one official charter
function of the FAA to promote air travel?
The FAA Should Inspect Itself, WASH. POST, May 23, 1996, at A20.
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airplanes or secured areas of airports 117 times.1 2 Various methods
were effectively used to circumvent security screening and other
barriers, including "piggybacking" (following authorized personnel
into restricted areas), which resulted in a stunning success rate of 71
successful incursions out of 75 attempts.'58 Other methods included
riding on elevators, walking through unlocked doors or gates, and
driving through unguarded vehicle gates.' Once they gained access
to secured areas, investigators were able to gain unauthorized access
to the airplanes of 35 different air carriers.
55
In its post-investigation report, the Inspector General's office
identified three causes for the nearly complete failure of the security
structure: (1) the ineffective implementation of security procedures
by airport operators and air carriers; (2) insufficient training of
security personnel; and (3) the failure of the FAA to impose an
effective oversight program. '5 Specifically, with regard to the FAA,
the report concluded that the agency's annual testing of airport
access control systems was insufficient. The deficiencies identified
included the failure to test all of the different aspects of the security
system and the failure to give appropriate emphasis to the most likely
threats.5"
Indeed, the investigation demonstrated that the agency had failed
to provide significant oversight over what it knew to be the most
common instance of security breach - the "piggybacking"
phenomenon. At two airports, investigators found that tests to
determine the extent of the piggybacking problem were only
performed eight times in two years, that no such tests were
performed at six other airports over the same period, and that at one
airport, no piggybacking tests had been performed for more than
eight years. ' 5
There is no indication that this report by the Inspector General
resulted in any measurable change in the FAA's regulatory activities
or its regulatory structure. While one might assume that the report
would have led the FAA to mandate a reduction in the level of
authority given to airports and airlines to manage their own security,
some new specific requirements for those security procedures, or
152. Teresa Anderson, Airport Security Fails Test, SEcuRITY MGMT., Feb. 2000, at 73.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See Anderson, supra note 152, at 73.
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some new standards for the training of security personnel, the air
security regulations of the FAA at the time of the September 11
attacks continued to rely almost exclusively on the private entities to
plan and implement their own security regimes. The regulations
provided almost no specific requirements for these private security
programs, and there have been no new standards issued for the
training of security employees.
The absence of a significant or comprehensive response to what
must be viewed as evidence of the complete ineffectiveness of the
nation's air security system in 1999 could be indicative of various• _ 159
factors, including excessive agency apathy or incompetence. But it
also clearly suggests that the FAA was more interested in retaining
the existing system of air security than in taking the proper steps to
ensure that it was actually effective. Although such steps -
including additional inspections, new regulations, new requirements
for security procedures and training - would have provided
undeniable benefits to the public's interest in safe air travel, equally
undeniable costs to the airline industry in the form of additional
outlays for security procedures and additional obligations created by
new regulations would have followed. The FAA's response here
provides additional support for the conclusion that the private
interests of the airline industry had, at least by 1999, overtaken public
policy concerns as the primary motivating imperative at the FAA.
Indeed, it appears that, prior to September 11, the airline industry
and its congressional lobbying apparatus (most notably the Air
Transport Association) "fought against any takeover of airport
security because they didn't want to have to pay more for it and
because they did not want potential passengers scared off by longer
lines or fear of hijacking." 160
This phenomenon of apparently lax regulatory oversight could be
reasonably ascribed to various factors other than agency capture,
159. Numerous press reports and additional government investigations provide
further evidence of the ineffectiveness of the nation's air security procedures prior to
1999. One New York Times report noted that in 1978 the FAA "found that screeners
failed to detect guns and pipe bombs 13 percent of the time in compliance tests,
while in 1987 the agency found that screeners missed 20 percent of the time. Since
then, the agency has stopped releasing figures." Micah Sifey, Boodle & Airline Security,
THE NATiON, Oct. 29, 2001 (page numbers unavailable).
160. Id.
[T] he vulnerability of our airports can be traced, in part, to the role of the
airline industry in lobbying year after year against any federal takeover of
airport security and its insistence on contracting the work out to low-bidding
companies that often pay little more than the minimum wage to the people
who check passengers' luggage and X-ray their handbags.
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including inefficiency, inattention, incompetence, or inertia. It is
this complexity of possible explanations that makes a conclusive
diagnosis of capture difficult in any instance. But it does provide
strong and compelling evidence that at least one of the reasonable
explanations for the FAA's continued reliance on an apparently
ineffective self-regulation mechanism is that the agency was the
victim of capture.
III. THE CURRENT FAA SECURITY REGULATIONS AND THE ROLE THEY
PLAYED IN THE SEPTEMBER 11 HIJACKINGS
The next question to be considered is whether any specific
regulatory consequences of the apparent hyper-influence of the
regulated community on the FAA can be identified. The specific
focus of this section is the agency's regulation of air security, and
whether the apparent capture phenomenon at the FAA resulted in a
security structure that did not provide adequate protection of the
public interest and may have played at least some role in creating the
atmosphere that allowed for the tragic events of September 11.
A. FAA Airport and Airline Security Regulations
The specific requirements and procedures for airline and airport
security are found in the implementing statutes for the U. S.
Department of Transportation, currently codified at 49 U.S.C.
Chapter 449. The provision provides, generally, that the FAA will
have the ultimate responsibility for promulgating regulations to
ensure air travel security, but that the most basic requirement for
implementing such regulations will be left up to the regulated
entities."'
The statute provides the specific parameters of the FAA's
responsibilities for regulating air travel security, namely that the
agency must "prescribe regulations to protect passengers and
property on [a commercial] aircraft... against an act of criminal
161.
The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall prescribe
regulations requiring screening of all passengers and property that will be
carried in a cabin of an aircraft in air transportation [and that] the
screening must take place before boarding and be carried out by a weapon-
detecting facility or procedure under or operated by an employee or agent
of an air carrier ....
49 U.S.C. § 44901 (a) (1994). The statute states that the FAA must issue regulations
that require air carriers to "refuse to transport" passengers or property of passengers
who do not consent to such weapon-detection screenings of the property of such
passengers. See id.
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violence or aircraft piracy," 16' and in a clear expression of the
agency's dual mandate, "consider whether a proposed regulation is
consistent with (A) protecting passengers; and (B) the public interest
in promoting air transportation and intrastate air transportation." 16
The statute also states that the FAA, "to the maximum extent
practicable" will require "a uniform procedure for searching and
detaining passengers." 164
The statute then proceeds, however, to significantly undermine the
stated requirement for "uniform procedures" by allowing for
different specific security programs to be implemented by every
airport. The statute states that:
The Administrator shall prescribe regulations [pursuant to the
"uniform procedures" requirements of the previous section] that
require each operator of an airport regularly serving an air carrier
holding a certificate issued by the Secretary of Transportation to
establish an air transportation security program that provides a law
enforcement presence and capability at each of those airports that
is adequate to ensure the safety of passengers.165
This portion of the statute authorizes airport operators to "use the
services of qualified State, local and private law enforcement
personnel," but recognizes the possibility of the involvement of
federal officials in airport security only when the Administrator
determines that "not enough qualified State, local, and private law
enforcement personnel are available to carry out" the security
requirements.1
The Administrator is obliged to approve an airport security
program as long as it incorporates specific information concerning
how the operator intends to carry out the security requirements
imposed by Section 107 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, 16 and "the method the airport operator will use to
monitor and audit the tenant's compliance with the security
requirements." 16 8 Consequently, the statute contemplates not only
that the ultimate responsibility for ensuring air travel safety will be
162. 49 U.S.C. § 44903(b) (1994).
163. 49 U.S.C. § 44903(b) (2) (1994).
164. 49 U.S.C. § 44903(b) (3) (1994).
165. 49 U.S.C. § 44903(c) (1) (1994).
166. Id. ("When deciding whether additional personnel are needed, the
Administrator shall consider the number of passengers boarded in the airport, the
extent of anticipated risk of criminal violence or aircraft piracy at the airport or to
the air carrier aircraft operation at the airport .... ").
167. 49 U.S.C. § 44903(c) (2) (A) (i) (1994).
168. 49 U.S.C. § 44903(c) (2) (A) (ii) (1994).
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delegated from the FAA to airport operators, but that it will indeed
be delegated again from the operators to their "tenants" - the
airlines themselves, who may delegate the actual daily responsibility
further to their permanent or contract employees1 9 This structure
sets up at least two additional tiers of "self-regulation" outside of the
direct oversight of the FAA.
In addition to its responsibility for review and approval of airport
security programs, the FAA, along with the FBI, is given the
responsibility to "assess current and potential threats to the domestic
air transportation system." 170 In furtherance of that responsibility,
the FAA and the FBI need to "carry out periodic threat and
vulnerability assessments on security at each airport that is part of the
domestic air transportation system." 171
Finally, the authorizing legislation provides that the FAA
promulgate regulations requiring " that an employment investigation,
including a criminal history record check, shall be conducted.., of
each individual employed in, or applying for, a position in which the
individual has unescorted access" to aircraft or secured areas of an
airport.
1 72
In the penalties portion of the legislation, the statute provides for
penalties for various violations of air travel security provisions.
Section 46505 provides that:
An individual shall be fined [and/or] imprisoned... (1) when on,
or attempting to get on, an aircraft in, or intended for operation
in, air transportation or intrastate air transportation, has on or
about the individual or the property of the individual a concealed
dangerous weapon that is or would be accessible to the individual
in flight; (2) has placed, attempted to place, or attempted to have
placed a loaded firearm on that aircraft in property not accessible
to passengers in flight; or (3) has on or about the individual, or has
placed, attempted to place, or attempted to have placed on that
169.
[T]he airport operator may not be found in violation [of this provision]
when the airport operator demonstrates that the tenant or an employee,
permitee, or invitee of the tenant is responsible for the violation and that the
airport operator has complied with all measures in its security program for
securing compliance with its security program by the tenant.
49 U.S.C. 44903(c) (2) (B) (1994).
170. 49 U.S.C. § 44904 (1994).
171. Id.
172. 49 U.S.C. § 44936(a) (1994). The provision also lists various crimes that will
disqualify an individual for relevant employment. See 49 U.S.C. § 44936(b) (1) (B)(994).
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aircraft, an explosive or incendiary device.
173
Left out of the specific security requirements in the statute, and
consequently left to the FAA to articulate in its regulations, is a
specific definition of what is considered to be a "dangerous weapon"
pursuant to Section 46505, or any other specific requirements
regarding minimum standards that various airport security programs
must meet.
The FAA's regulations promulgating the security requirements of
Chapter 449 are found in 14 C.F.R. Parts 107 and 108. Part 107 deals
directly with "airport" security, while Part 108 focuses on security of
"aircraft operators." In general, pursuant to both parts, and
matching the structure contemplated by the authorizing legislation,
the FAA allows for significant levels of self-monitoring and planning
on the part of both the airlines and airport authorities in the course
of developing their "security programs" and other safety and security
procedures.
Indeed, the remarkably brief part 107 provides little additional
specification of exactly what must be included in the airport security
program. Sections 107.101 and 107.103 are the central provisions
providing the requirements for airport security programs. Mirroring
the requirements of Chapter 449, section 107.101 provides that no
airport may be operated without a security plan that " provides for the
safety and security of persons and property on an aircraft operating
in air transportation or intrastate air transportation against an act of
criminal violence, aircraft piracy, and the introduction of deadly or
dangerous weapons, explosives, or incendiary onto an aircraft."174
Section 107.101 then provides for minimal requirements for security
plans of airports servicing "scheduled passenger or public chartered
passenger operations with an aircraft having a passenger seating
configuration of more than 60 seats." 115 Recordkeeping
requirements and procedures for disclosure of information are
included within the section. However, the regulations provide no
other specific requirements for what must be included in an airport
security program.176
In addition to requiring the development of the security program,
173. 49 U.S.C. § 46505(b) (1994).
174. 14 C.F.R. § 107.101(a)(1) (2001).
175. These requirements include the following: (1) a description of the secured
areas; (2) a description of the air operations areas, detailing the exact boundaries;
(3) a description of the security identification display areas; and (4) a description of
sterile areas. See 14 C.F.R. § 107.103(a)(1)-(21) (2001). See also 14 C.F.R. §
108.101(a) (1) (2001) (describing requirements based on the size of aircraft).
176. See 14 C.F.R. § 107.103(a)-(d) (2001).
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the regulations detail specific "control functions" that must be
performed by the airport operator, including: controlling access to
air operations areas by implementing methods for restricting such
access; ' n controlling the movement of people and vehicles within the
areas; and detecting any unauthorized penetration of such areas.178
The regulations require the airport operators to provide sufficient
law enforcement personnel to support the security program and the
passenger screening system.'79 As a general matter, airport operators
are expected to use state, local, or private law enforcement personnel
to perform these security functions. But the regulations also allow
for airport officials to request that the FAA authorize the deployment
of federal security officers when other kinds of officers are not
"available in sufficient numbers." 180
The regulations, pursuant again to the specific parameters of the
statutory mandate, provide rules for regulating the movement of
individuals in airports. They provide that no individual may be
allowed to enter a restricted area in an airport without submitting to
a "screening of his or her person and accessible property." 18' Also,
that no person in such an area (other than a law enforcement
official) may have "an explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous
weapon on or about the individual's person or accessible property."
There is nothing in Part 107 of Title 14, however, that provides a
specific list of "deadly" or "dangerous" weapons, or even provides
the parameters for making such a determination. Yet, the FAA has,
on occasion, provided direct statements as to what meets the
definition of "dangerous weapons" in the form of agency guidelines
sent directly to airport operators,'18 or in the discussions of proposed
177. See 14 C.F.R. § 107.14 (2001) (providing that the airport operator must
submit to the FAA a proposed system for limiting access to restricted areas that "shall
ensure that only those persons authorized to have access to secured areas by the
airport operator's security program are able to obtain that access and shall
specifically provide a means to ensure that such access is denied immediately at the
access point or points to individual whose authority to have access changes").
178. See 14 C.F.R. § 107.203 (2001).
179. See 14 C.F.R. § 107.215 (2001).
180. See 14 C.F.R. § 107.219 (2001).
181. 14 C.F.R. § 108.201(c) (2001).
182. For example, the following guideline was sent by the FAA in 1973, and was
cited as an indication of the agency's policy by the U.S. Third Circuit Court of
Appeals. See United States v. Margraf, 493 F.2d 1206, 1207 (3d Cir. 1974). The FAA
guidelines are as follows:
The following guidelines are furnished to airport operators, air carriers, law
enforcement personnel, and others involved in preboard screening of
passengers in making a reasonable determination of what property in
possession of a passenger should be considered as a weapon or dangerous
object.
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rules published in the Federal Register,18 3 resulting in the restriction,
for example, of knives of more than four inches.'8 But, the agency
has also indicated that ultimate determinations about what
constitutes a dangerous weapon are "subjective," and further that it
is the "airline's responsibility to determine what they will allow." 85
The FAA has already altered this stance following the September 11
attacks, issuing a uniform rule through its website, press releases, and
directives to airports and airlines' 86 that "no knives or cutting
instruments of any size or material will be allowed in the aircraft
cabin." 187
FIREARMS - Including starter pistols, compressed air or BB guns and flare
pistols.
KNIVES - All sabres, swords, hunting knives, and such other knives
considered illegal by local law.
BLUDGEONS - Blackjacks, billy clubs, or similar instruments.
OTHER DEVICES OR OBJECTS -Even though not commonly thought of
as a dangerous weapon but the possession of which supports the reasonable
presumption that it could be used as weapons, such as ice picks, straight
razors, elongated scissors, and the like. Any questionable device or object to
include toy or dummy weapons or grenades should be treated as a
dangerous article.
The following objects should also be prohibited in the interest of air security:
EXPLOSIVES/AMMUNITION -All types of explosives, ammunition,
incendiaries, and fireworks whether commercially manufactured,
homemade, or any combination of components to produce the same.
GASES AND CHEMICAL AGENTS - All tear gas, mace, and similar
chemicals and gases whether in pistol, pen, canister, or other container.
In those instances where an undeclared firearm or other obviously
dangerous weapon is discovered concealed in a carry-on bag or on the
person of a passenger, appropriate law enforcement authorities must be
notified. ATA and AOCI requested to pass information through their
channels.
Id. at 1207 n.l.
183. See, e.g., Transportation of Hazardous Material; Miscellaneous Amendments,
62 Fed. Reg. 50,222, 50,222 (1997) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 172, 173, 175, 177, 178,
180) (defining "deadly or dangerous weapons" to include mace, pepper spray, tear
gas and other "disabling or incapacitating.. . chemicals or gases").
184. See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, '72 FAA Policy Permitted Pocketknives, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2001, at A20.
The Federal Aviation Administration forbids 'deadly' or 'dangerous' articles
in airline cabins, but until this week's devastating hijackings, knives with
blades less than 4 inches long were considered neither. The 4-inch rule
dates back to 1972, when the FAA first ordered airlines to screen passengers
for weapons to thwart a worldwide wave of hijackings.
Id.
185. See CIVIL AVIATION SEC., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., PASSENGER INFORMATION:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (last visited Jan. 21, 2002), available at
http://cas.faa.gov/faq.html.
186. See U.S. DEPT. TRANSPORTATION, FACT SHEET, Nov. 19, 2001 (stating that
knives found during security screening, including kirpans, will be confiscated, and a
ground security officer and/or law enforcement coordinator may be notified).
187. PRESS RELEASE, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, FAA ADVISES AIR
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Part 108 of 14 C.F.R. regulates the security activities of the
airlines. ' 8 Much like the structure and substantive requirements of
Part 107 (which relate to airports), this section requires that air
carriers take the primary direct responsibility for the development
and implementation of security procedures. The regulations require
that air carriers "adopt and carry out a security program" '8 that
meets the same basic requirements that apply to the security
programs of airport operators.'19 The regulations require air carriers
to use FAA-approved procedures, detailed in their security program,
to screen all passengers, and to refuse to transport any person who
does not consent to search pursuant to these screening procedures, ' 9'
or to prevent any person from having "a deadly or dangerous
weapon, either concealed or unconcealed, accessible to him or her
while aboard an airplane." ,g
Indeed, the primary responsibility for screening airline passengers
(as opposed to other individuals at airports) rests with the air
carriers, not the airport operators. 93  Air carriers are required to
prevent any passenger from placing any explosive, incendiary or
loaded firearm in checked baggage.'1 While the provision does
TRAVELERS ON AIRPORT AIRLINE SECURITY MEASURES (Oct. 8, 2001), available at
http://www.faa.gov/apa/pr/pr.cfm?id=1435. See Hearing on Aviation Security
Following the Terrorists Attacks on September 11, Before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the
House Committee on Transportation & Infrastructure, 107th Cong. (2001) (statements of
Jane F. Garvey, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration).
Knives or other dangerous objects may no longer be sold or used in the
sterile terminal areas - those areas beyond the security checkpoints.
Similarly, all cutting instruments, including knives, scissors, and razor blades,
plastic or otherwise, are banned from carry-on luggage.
Id.
188. 14 C.F.R. § 108.1 (2001) (prescribing aviation security rules governing the
procedures of aircraft operators).
189. 14 C.F.R. § 108.101 (2001).
190. See 14 C.F.R. § 108.103 (2001) (requiring that each air carrier safety program
"[p] rovide for the safety of person and property traveling on flights provided by the
aircraft operator against acts of criminal violence and air piracy, and the
introduction of explosives, incendiaries, or deadly or dangerous weapons aboard an
aircraft"). The provision requires that these security programs be approved by the
FAA, and that they include the procedures that will be used to meet the
requirements set out in the remainder of Part 108. See 14 C.F.R. § 108.105 (2001).
The regulations also provide similar procedures for the amendment and approval of
security programs. See id.
191. See 14 C.F.R. § 108.201(2001) (stating that " [e]ach aircraft operator shall
deny entry into a sterile area and shall refuse to transport any person who does not
consent to a search or inspection of his or her person in accordance with the
screening system prescribed in this section").
192. 14 C.F.R. § 108.201(2001).
193. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 108.201, 108.203 (2001) (noting that the aircraft operator
shall be the one who denies entry and refuses to transport such persons).
194. See 14 C.F.R. § 108.203 (2001).
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provide some detailed description of various kinds of firearms and
the different procedures required for them, it does not, just as Part
107 does not, provide for a specific definition of what constitutes a
deadly or dangerous weapon."'
The only part of the regulations that specifically addresses
procedures for preventing hijackings provides for the designation of
the pilot of any given flight as the "Inflight Security Coordinator."
This pilot is required to "carry out the Inflight Security Coordinator
duties specified in the certificate holder's approved security
program." There are no uniform FAA regulations that specifically
address either the prevention of hijacking, or the management of a
hijacking incident once it occurs,196 with the sole exception of the
requirement that the air carrier notify federal and state authorities
immediately "upon receiving information that an act or suspected act
of air piracy has been committed." 197 Any such specifics are left to
the individual air carriers and their individual security programs.
The regulations provide relatively detailed standards for the
qualifications of individuals employed by air carriers to perform the
security functions set out in Part 108. The air carrier must ensure
that all security personnel understand as much of the air carriers
security program as is required by their job description, and that a
Ground Security Coordinator will review all security function and
immediately initiate "corrective action for each instance of
noncompliance" with Part 108, the security program, or any FAA
security directives. The regulations also require that no individual
can be employed by an air carrier to perform screening functions
unless that person has a high school diploma (or equivalent), and
the visual and physical skills necessary to perform assigned functions:
the ability to read, speak, and write English well enough to carry out
written and oral instructions; read credentials and airline tickets;
provide direction to and understand English-speaking passengers;
and write reports as well as keep written security records.'9 These
employees must also complete any specialized training required by
the air carriers security program.
The provisions also include criminal background check
195. See 14 C.F.R. § 108.203 (2001) (stating, for example, that "a loaded firearm
means a firearm which has a live round of ammunition, or any component thereof in
the chamber or cylinder or in a magazine inserted in the firearm:").
196. See 14 C.F.R. § 108.303 (2001) (providing specific instructions in the
regulations for how pilots should handle bomb threats).
197. 14 C.F.R. § 108.303(d) (2001).
198. See 14 C.F.R. § 108.213 (a) (setting standards for aircraft operator employees).
199. 14 C.F.R. § 108.213(a) (4) (2001).
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requirements for air carrier security employees similar to those
required of airport employees, and for periodic re-evaluation of
screening personnel by the Ground Security Coordinator. ° The
regulations require that air carriers allow Federal Air Marshals " in
the number and manner specified by the [FAA] Administrator, on
each scheduled passenger operations and public charter passenger
operation" specified by the FAA."1
B. From Hijacking to Hijacking: Agency Capture and the Failure of Air
Security
The FAA's air security regulatory structure is both exemplary of,
and consistent with, the theory that the agency is the victim of
excessive influence from its primary regulated body, the airline
industry. While the regulations focus on the broad requirement of
public safety, they seem to be designed to enhance, as much as
possible, the control that airline and airport interests will have on any
specific requirements that are implemented. The two main features
of this regulatory structure - the delegation of authority to airlines
and airports to make and enforce their own security programs and
the lack of significant specific requirements for what must be
included in these programs - provide substantial advantages to the
private interests of the regulated industry at the expense of the public
interest in avoiding the kind of tragedy that occurred on September
11.
When assessing the relative capture status of an agency, the
primary question is whether the regulatory acts or structure of the
agency serve to promote the private interest of the capturing entity at
the expense of the public, particularly in comparison to other
reasonable alternative acts or structures that might have provided
better protection of the public at the expense of the private interest.
The FAA airport and airline security regulations are the product of
the dominant regulatory culture of the agency - the delegation of
extensive authority to private entities to self-regulate. The alternative
to this structure, specifically in regard to airport and airline
regulations, would be for the agency to promulgate specific
requirements for the airports and airline to follow, to develop some
reasonable review structure to ensure that the entities were adhering
to the regulations, and, perhaps, to provide for the use of federal
officials, or other law enforcement "professionals" to implement the
200. 14 C.F.R. § 108.213(d) (2001).
201. 14 C.F.R. § 108.223(b) (2001).
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security regimes.
But, even if there were reasons independent of the benefits to the
private interest of the airlines that militated toward preserving the
FAA's self-regulation structure, information in the form of the
agency's own audits of the nation's airline security system should
have demonstrated, long before September 11, that some changes
were necessary - either severe consequences for security lapses
and/or even more extensive audit procedures - to properly serve
the public interest in making airlines as free as possible from the
threat of hijacking.
Given the remarkably "low-tech" nature of the September 11
hijackings, it is difficult to make a direct causal link between any
specific FAA regulation, or absence of a regulation, and the criminal
acts. Depending on the validity of the press reports concerning the
weapons that were used on September 11, the hijackers were either
able to smuggle restricted weapons past various check points in at
least three different cities, or the weapons they used were not
prohibited by the applicable regulatory definitions.2a Either way, the
regulatory choices of the FAA are relevant to an analysis of these
events. If restricted weapons were smuggled onto the airplanes, then
the effectiveness of the screening procedures would be at issue,
and/or if the weapons used were not restricted, the choice not to
provide a specific definition of "deadly" weapons would be critical.
Consequently, the aspects of the FAA regulatory regime that are
most relevant to an analysis of these events appear to be the
following: (1) the delegation of nearly unbounded authority to
airports and air carriers to come up with their own security plans; (2)
the authorization for these parties to sub-delegate this authority again
to private contractors; (3) the lack of any significant requirements for
the qualifications or training of these subcontractors; and (4) the
lack of uniform specific definitions of what constitutes a "dangerous"
weapon that cannot be transported onto an airplane. Again, the
question here is whether these regulations, particularly when
compared to the regulatory alternatives that were not chosen, can be
reasonably viewed as unduly protective of an identifiable private
interest at the expense of a public one, and therefore, indicative of
the airline industry's capture of the FAA. If alternative regulatory
regimes or decisions can be identified that would have provided
202. See, e.g., Michael A. Hiltzik et al., How did Hijackers Get Past Airport Security?,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, at Al (describing how the hijackers slid through
loopholes in airport security, and the possibility that the box cutters either went
undetected or were not prohibited onboard the airlines).
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objectively better air security, and the only negative consequence of
these alternatives would have been to significantly undermine the
private interest of the airline companies, then the argument in favor
of capture remains strong.
A structure that relies heavily on the airlines not only to
promulgate their own safety procedures might seem to be contrary to
the financial interest of the airline. Nonetheless, the structure
actually ensures that the companies involved will have the vital ability
to control their security expenditures, and determine how the
expenditures are likely to change over time. If the FAA were to
promulgate one security plan to be implemented by all airports and
airlines (or at least, one set of essential security procedures that must
be in each plan), that plan might include provisions that would
either be expensive to implement or unnecessary from the
perspective of one airline; or group of airlines. One obvious example
is that the FAA might require that law enforcement professionals be
used at all airports to perform security checks. Assuming such
professionals would be paid substantially higher salaries than the
contract employees, who at least possess a high school equivalency
which the regulations allow for and the airlines apparently use, the
lack of a uniform requirement makes it much easier for the airlines
to meet the security requirements while spending less money. In
addition, assuming that professionals trained in law enforcement
techniques would, in the aggregate, provide a more effective security
service, this provides a clear instance where the FAA has apparently
favored the private interest of the air industry over the broader
interest of the public.
This is not to say that the airlines or airports are not concerned
with safety, or that they would always favor more lenient FAA security
regulations. Indeed, as the post September 11 world has
demonstrated, security lapses can be as, or even more, devastating to
corporate bottom lines than expensive and intrusive government
regulation. The point is that, given a choice between a structure that
involves the imposition of requirements from a central authority and
one that allows for each individual entity to determine these
requirements, private individual entities will invariably prefer the
freedom to chose their own structure and to alter that structure as
they see fit over time. The lack of requirements for screening
personnel is just one of the many industry-friendly consequences of
the FAA's dominant regulatory philosophy - the delegation of
substantial self-regulating authority to its industry.
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, it was suggested in various
corners of the mainstream media that the airlines might actually want
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to turn the responsibility for airline security over to the federal
government, and, specifically, that they might want federal officials to
screen passengers at airports.2 While one could imagine how the
tragic and costly events might have shifted industry perceptions of
the importance of security, one might also imagine that the airlines
could stand to save money if, for example, one federal security system
for all airports and airlines was implemented, and federal or other
government security officials were installed to monitor such a plan.
Such a structure would nonetheless, in the long run, undermine the
private interests of the airline industry because it would take away the
vital factor that is key to profit generation - control over the costs of
doing business.
While any number of structures could be envisioned, it is likely that
any federally supervised or manned security system in airports would
not be provided by the United States as a gratuity to the industry and
the traveling public. Some sort of revenue stream would almost
certainly fund any such service with its source in the airline industry,
either a tax on tickets or on the industry itself (that would likely be
passed on to ticket-buyers in the form of higher ticket prices). So,
while such a plan would not likely bankrupt the airlines and the
airport authorities, it would not provide a financial windfall either.
Therefore, there would be little, if any, incentive to replace the
current system which, again, allows for almost unfettered control of
security costs in the hands of the air industry, with a plan that would
create financial uncertainty and no profit opportunities, and negative
financial consequences at worst.
It could be argued that the airlines might favor a federally run
security plan because of the shield to future liability exposure it could
provide (no longer responsible for security screening, the airlines
would not be subject to lawsuits in the future by the victims of
security lapses). But such concerns seem to have little, if any, impact
on the relative hostility that industry representatives have for
increased regulatory oversight or requirements. Even assuming that
stricter regulations might lessen the likelihood of problems, mistakes,
203. See Carol Eisenberg et al., Terrorist Attacks; 'System Failed Miserably,' NEWSDAY,
Sept. 16, 2001, at N9 (reporting that the airline industry's trade group, the Air
Transportation Association of America, called for the federal government to take
over the passenger screening process, expand the air marshal program, and deploy
uniformed armed guards in airports). The Air Transportation Association of
America stated that "recent events demand a change" in passing aviation security
responsibilities on the industry. Id. See also Lauren Terrazzano & Sylvia Adcock,
Airline Industry Blocked Many Security Proposals, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 21, 2001,
at 1D (quoting Michael Wascum of the Air Transportation Association, as saying that
airliners never wanted to be in the security screening business). "It was delegated to
us by the federal government. We are not law enforcement agencies." Id.
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or injuries, and result in fewer lawsuits and diminished liability
exposure, private entities generally prefer to factor that potential
exposure into a cost-benefit analysis, and to reject additional
regulatory requirements if their aggregate cost, which is certain and
immediate, exceeds the likely cost of responding to future liability
claims that might never arise, and whose cost can be spread out over
time in the form of annuities and other long-term payment
mechanisms.
The post-September 11 circumstances could produce an even
more important indirect incentive for the airlines to seek federal
involvement - particularly visible and obvious federal involvement
- in security screening. After the terrorist attacks, American
commercial aviation was grounded for two and a half days. Even
when planes began to fly again, there was a dramatic decrease in
passengers, with the ridership still down as much as forty percent as
of early November. Indications are that much of the reluctance to fly
stems from concerns about air security.204 An obvious and extensive
federal presence could alleviate some of these fears, and
consequently bring passengers back. But even if airlines see federal
involvement as a useful short-term response to the current public
perceptions, it is unlikely that they would see such involvement as aJ
viable long-term approach. Presumably, security fears will diminish
over time, and as the public's confidence in air travel increases, the
benefit provided by federal involvement in screening will diminish in
comparison to the additional costs that such involvement produces.
Indeed, the impressive increase in airline passengers since the
attacks, even without additional federal involvement in security,
might convince airline officials that even the short-term boost in
confidence from a heightened federal presence might not be
necessary.
In addition to delegating primary oversight functions to the
airlines and the airports, the FAA's security regulations provide few
specific requirements for how security is to be implemented at
airports and on airplanes. The agency might have followed its basic
regulatory philosophy of significant delegation of authority, but still
provided a set of specific requirements that must be part of any
security program devised by an airport or an air carrier. The
regulations could have, for example, specified experience and/or
training requirements of employees involved in airport screening as
opposed to going so far as to mandate the use of federal officials at
204. Chris A. Courogen, Travel Business Rises But Trails Last Year's Pace, SUNDAY
PATRIOT-NEws HARRISBURG, Nov. 4, 2001, atJ05.
2002]
438 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 10:2
each airport. Again, as it must be assumed that additional training
and experience would only enhance the effectiveness of these
employees, the broad public interest appears again to have been
discounted.
Perhaps the most surprising gap in the FAA's regulatory structure
is the lack of specific regulatory definitions as to what weapons are
too dangerous to allow on airplanes, and/or the agency conclusion
that knives did not pose enough of a threat for hijacking or other
criminal acts in the air to justify their restriction. The regulations
provide no specific list of restricted weapons (other than some
discussion of the proper treatment of various different types of
firearms) and those definitions which have been provided to airports
and airlines in the form of specific agency directives failed to address
the potential impact that even a small knife in the hands of a
criminal on an airplane might have.
Again, to assess the impact of agency capture on this regulatory
choice - here, the decision not to provide a detailed list of
dangerous weapons that would have included any and all knives -
one must compare the public benefits and private costs of any
alternative regulatory decision to the one that was chosen. The
impact of this kind of specific requirement would be the same as the
general impact of any centrally mandated requirement discussed
above, the imposition of a cost that the private entity could not
control. In this instance, the impact of providing a list of restricted
items, and of adding items that otherwise would not be restricted to
this list, would require a more extensive and costly screening process.
Baggage and individuals would have to be searched more closely, and
presumably, more skill and expertise would be required to ensure
that relatively small, perhaps even non-metal, devices were not
transported onto planes.
In addition, the inclusion of specific types of weapons or items as
precluded would have made airport screening failures easier to
conclusively identify, making it easier for oversight inspectors to
definitively criticize the screening functions in particular airports. In
the absence of a detailed list of precluded devices, or at least with a
far less extensive list than could be provided, the air carriers will be in
a much better position to defend supposed lapses in their screening
procedures by arguing that they met the requirements of the
relatively vague preclusions, and that any specific "weapon" that
made it through screening was not sufficiently "dangerous" in their
estimation to require that it be kept off an airplane. Like any other
industry, the next best thing to no regulatory requirements enforced
from on high, would be relatively vague requirements that allow for
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significant wiggle room.
One of the many impacts of the September 11 attacks appears to
be a renewed focus on the deficiencies in the FAA's regulation of
airport security. Indeed, the immediate aftermath of the attacks has
seen new calls to take the security responsibilities away from the FAA
as a result of some of the obvious impact of its dual mandate and its
inherent consequences for diffusion of agency security concerns and
focus .2' As one member of the Gore Commission stated after the
September 11 attacks: "The wrong people regulate airport security.
The FAA is incompetent because it's an agency that promotes
aviation commerce and security. It's a conflict." 2
C. The Future of the FAA and Air Security
On October 11, 2001, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed a bill (S.
1447) that sought to overhaul the nation's airport security
regulations and procedures. In the "Findings" section of the
provision, the Senate noted that the attacks of September 11
required "the United States to change fundamentally the way it
approaches the task of ensuring the safety and security of the civil air
transportation system" and that the "existing fragmentation of
responsibility of that safety and security among government agencies
and between government and nongovernmental entities is inefficient
and unacceptable."2
Pursuant to a recommendation from the General Accounting
Office ("GAO"), the bill called for the transfer of all security
functions at United States airports to federal government
personnel.2 The language provided that the Attorney General, in
205. See Mead, supra note 93 (statement of Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General
U.S. Department of Transportation, before the House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Aviation).
The deployment and use of security technology will require short-term and
long-term actions. As we testified in a prior hearing before this
Subcommittee, given the scope and complexity of the security challenge as
we now know it, we believe the time has come to consider the option of
vesting governance of the program and responsibility for the provision of
security in one Federal organization. This entity should have security as its
primary and central focus, profession, and mission. The federal
organization would be responsible for purchasing, deploying and using the
equipment to screen passengers, employees (anyone with access to the
aircraft), carryon baggage, checked baggage, and cargo.
Id. See also Mike McAndrew, Many Security Suggestions Put on Shelf, HERALD AM., Sept.
23, 2001, at A9 (quoting Kathleen Flynn, a member of the Gore Commission, stating
that "the oversight for security should be taken away from the FAA").
206. Id. (quoting Kathleen Flynn).
207. S. 1447, 107th Cong. § 101 (3)-(4) (2001).
208. S. 1447, 107th Cong. § 101 (5) (2001).
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consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, must provide for
the screening of all passengers, mail, cargo, and baggage before it
may go onboard a commercial airline.2 The provision also requires
that the Attorney General establish a program for the hiring and
training of federal officials who will carry out these screening
functions, and create standards for background checks of those
considered.210
The bill delegated for specific responsibility to the Deputy
Secretary of Transportation to coordinate the security related
functions of the FAA, the Department of Justice and other
- -. 211
government entities with relevant responsibilities. In addition, the
bill called for the creation of an "Aviation Security Coordination
Council" to be chaired by the Secretary of Transportation or his
designee, which would "work with the intelligence community to
coordinate intelligence, security, and criminal enforcement activities
affecting the safety and security of aviation at all United States
airports .. 212 The bill also included specific new regulations for
21321
securing the doors to the flight deck , deploying air marshals,z" and
211
enhancing anti-hijacking training for flight crews.
On November 2, 2001, after a long and heated debate, the U.S.
House of Representatives passed its version of an airport security bill,
which contained many provisions that were identical to the Senate
version, including the creation of an Aviation Security Coordinating
Council; the enhancement of flight deck security; and the anti-
hijacking training for airline personnel.116 The House version of the
bill contained two crucial differences, however. First, while the
House bill acknowledged the conclusion of the GAO that "security
functions and security personnel at United States airports should
become a Federal government responsibility," it did not actually
require the use of federal officials to perform airport security
functions. It required, instead, that the Secretary of Transportation
209. S. 1447, 107th Cong. § 108 (2001).
210. S. 1447, 107th Cong. § 109 (2001).
211. S. 1447, 107th Cong. § 102(d) (2001).
212. S. 1447, 107th Cong. § 103 (2001) (providing that individuals designated as
members of the Committee include the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency).
213. S. 1447, 107th Cong. § 104 (2001) (prohibiting access to the flight deck by
unauthorized personnel during a flight, requiring that the flight deck door be
. strengthened," and mandating that the door from the cabin be locked (and a key
given only to flight personnel)).
214. S. 1447, 107th Cong. § 105 (2001).
215. S. 1447, 107th Cong. § 107 (2001).
216. H.R. 2951, 107th Cong. § 4, 5, 8 (2001).
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"establish an air transportation security program at each airport,"
and that in carrying out these programs, the Administrator may use
qualified State, local or private law enforcement personnel, FAA
personnel, or other federal personnel.217 In addition, the House bill
provided for no allocation of new air security responsibility to the
Department of Justice or any other arm of the federal government
outside the Department of Transportation and the FAA, as compared
to the Senate Bill's provision for extensive new Department of Justice
involvement in air security.
On November 16, House and Senate conferees reached a
compromise which included the Senate bill's requirement for federal
screeners, but limited their required use to only two years, allowing
airports to "opt out" of the federal system at that time.1 8 More
significantly, the compromise bill provided for a new semi-
independent agency partially under the authority of the Department
of Transportation, entitled the Transportation Security
Administration ("TSA"). The bill gave the new agency oversight
authority over the screening activities of federal officials, and the
authority to promulgate regulations concerning the safety and
security of commercial air traffic and other forms of domestic
transportation without the consent of the Department of
Transportation or other executive branch agencies.2 9  This
compromise bill was signed into law by President Bush on November
19, 2001.
The final version of the airline security legislation has two main
advantages over both the pre-September 11 structure and either of
the two initial proposals from the House and Senate. First, it creates
a new agency and shifts at least some of the air security
responsibilities of the FAA to that new agency. Second, it vests that
authority in an agency with oversight responsibility over a wide array
of industries, thereby diversifying the agency's regulated community,
and consequently, reducing the likelihood of successful hyper-
influence by one organized interest group.
While the question of whether the baggage screeners would be
federal was apparently the key stumbling block for the House and
Senate, and was certainly the issue that garnered the most public
attention, the crucial issue in the review and potential overhaul of air
security regulation is not whether private or federal screening
officials are used at American airports, but whether the procedures
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that the screeners implement are sufficient, and the screeners are
sufficiently trained and experienced to implement them. The
presence of well-trained, experienced, and highly motivated officials
will not produce a detailed, stringent, and closely monitored security
system where one does not otherwise exist. If federal officials are
used to perform security screening, but no specific requirements for
screening are implemented, or there is insufficient ongoing
evaluation of the adherence to these requirements, the presence of
these officials would be expected to have little or no impact on air
security.
While the new air security bill does not ensure the development of
a sufficiently stringent air security system in this country, it does make
such a development more likely by changing the entity where these
regulations will be developed, and consequently, the dynamics
inherent in that development.
CONCLUSION
The evidence cited and discussed in this Article is insufficient to
provide conclusive proof that the FAA, and its obligation to ensure the
safety of air travelers, and the nation as a whole, have been
compromised by the phenomenon of agency capture. But it is more
than sufficient to demonstrate that the FAA, given its dual mandate
and apparent susceptibility to influence, is the wrong entity to be
making and enforcing air security requirements in this country. The
public interest in air security is crucial not only to the tens of millions
of air travelers every year, but, as the events of September 11
demonstrate, to everyone on the ground as well. Although the
impact of air security regulations on the profitability of the airline
industry must be considered at some level - perhaps as one of many
factors considered by the Secretary of Transportation and ultimately
the President - the body that has the primary obligation for
determining what provisions and enforcement mechanisms will make
air travel safe should not be concerned with anything other than
relevant safety concerns.
The FAA demonstrates all the signs of an agency that has allowed
private pressure to undermine its public responsibility, and its
regulations are tragically deficient as a result. Responsibility for air
security is too important to entrust to such an entity, and the decision
to shift that responsibility to a new governmental body with an
exclusive mandate, with no obligation to promote anything other
than the safety of the nation and its people, is a wise and prudent
choice.
